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Over the last three years, a disturbing development has occurred
in disability-discrimination law regarding HIV-infected individuals.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
indicated that individuals with asymptomatic HIV disease' are not
disabled under the principal definition of "disability" in the
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1. An individual who is HIV positive is considered asymptomatic during the period of
time that she does not experience any manifest symptoms of HIV disease. Asymptomatic
HIV disease is characterized as follows:
With few exceptions, there is a progressive diminution of CD4+ T cell counts
during this asymptomatic period which ultimately leads to a state of immunosup-
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Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the Act or the ADA).2 The
Fourth Circuit is the first federal jurisdiction to interpret the Act's
protective scope so narrowly. As this Comment shows, the court's view
ignores congressional intent, contravenes regulations promulgated by
federal agencies authorized to enforce the ADA, and curiously stands
alone among federal courts that have ruled on this same issue.
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion allows employers lawfully to
discharge asymptomatic HIV-positive employees based on their HIV
status alone, and allows business owners to refuse service in places of
public accommodation based solely on an individual's HIV-positive
status. It is unlikely that the framers of the ADA intended to permit
such discrimination.
Part I of this Comment will explore the ADA-its origins and
development-in the emerging civil rights jurisprudence of the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s. The Act authorizes various federal agencies to
promulgate regulations enforcing its provisions.3 As these regulations
expressly include asymptomatic HIV infection as a disability,4 they are
consistent with Congress's intent in the late 1980s to protect
asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals under the ADA. The
regulations, therefore, are entitled to substantial deference by the
courts.
Part II will review five federal cases from the 1990s that examine
the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV infection constitutes a
disability under the ADA. The court in each of these cases concluded
that asymptomatic HIV infection is indeed a disability. Significantly,
pression that is severe enough (CD4+ T cell count <200 per microliter) to place
the patient at high risk for opportunistic, and hence clinically apparent, disease.
HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1588 (KurtJ. Isselbacher et al. eds., 13th ed.
1994); accord STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICIONARY 160 (26th ed. 1995) (defining "asymptom-
atic" as "[w]ithout symptoms, or producing no symptoms"); infra note 237 (discussing
asymptomatic H1V disease).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The Fourth Circuit stated that individuals with
asymptomatic HIV disease are not disabled under the principal statutory definition of
disability-that is, not disabled with respect to having "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual .... " Id.
§ 12102(2) (A); accord Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (Runnebaum II) (ruling that the language in the ADA requires a nexus
between the physical effect of impairment and a major life activity and that asymptomatic
HIV is not a disability under the statutory definition); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. &
Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating in dicta that, absent exceptional
evidence to the contrary, an individual with asymptomatic HIV disease is not disabled
because he has neither a physical impairment nor any impairment that substantially limits
any of his major life activities).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12134, 12149, 12164, 12186, 12204.
4. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
1998] 559
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the First Circuit has recently decided in Abbott v. Bragdon,5 in contrast
to the Fourth Circuit's rulings, that asymptomatic HIV infection
constitutes a disability under the ADA.6 Abbott is now before the
United States Supreme Court, and a decision on whether
asymptomatic HIV disease is a disability under the ADA is expected by
this summer.
Part III analyzes two Fourth Circuit decisions, Ennis v. National
Ass'n of Business & Educational Radio7 and Runnebaum v. NationsBank of
Maryland, N.A.,' both of which rejected asymptomatic HIV infection
as a federally protected disability under the ADA's principal definition
of disability.9 When one compares the court's reasoning in these
decisions to another recent Fourth Circuit decision, in which the
court emphasized the virus's virulence,1" the Fourth Circuit's attitude
toward individuals with HIV disease seems to reflect the very
stereotypes that the Act seeks to eliminate. Based on the Fourth
Circuit's approach to HIV-related discrimination cases (i.e., its
wholesale rejection of congressional intent, administrative
regulations, and case law from other circuits), the authors conclude
that the Fourth Circuit's position in Ennis and Runnebaum11 is not
grounded in reasoned analysis, but instead upon an unfortunate
disregard for the court's proper role to effectuate the clear intent of
the Act.
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
President Bush signed the ADA into law in July 1990.12 The Act
charged the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) with the responsibility of
5. 107 F.3d 934, 943 (1st Cir.), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
6. See id.
7. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
8. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (Runnebaum I1).
9. Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60; Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 168.
10. See Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the plaintiff, an asymptomatic HIV-positive neurosurgical resident, posed a
significant risk to patients-a risk that could not be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation and therefore was not an "otherwise qualified" individual with a
disability).
11. The Ennis and Runnebaum courts indicated that individuals with asymptomatic HIV
disease are neither impaired nor substantially limited in a major life activity. See
Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 172; Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60.
12. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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promulgating regulations to carry out certain provisions of the ADA. 3
These EEOC and DOJ regulations indicate, inter alia, that asymptom-
atic HIV infection is covered as a disability under the language of the
Act.
1 4
When interpreting statutory language, federal courts must give
substantial deference to administrative regulations that effectuate the
intent of Congress.1" As the legislative history shows, there is no
doubt that Congress intended to cover asymptomatic HIV infection as
a "disability" under the ADA.' 6 Courts, therefore, should restrain any
impulse to impose their own agenda on a piece of remedial civil rights
legislation that was intended to protect from discrimination individu-
als with asymptomatic HIV infection.
A. The ADA
Federal legislation protecting the civil rights of individuals with
disabilities has evolved from post-World War II prohibitions against
disability employment-discrimination within the United States Civil
Service 7 to equal-rights guarantees for disabled individuals within the
federal government or institutions receiving federal financing under
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.18 In the 1970s and 1980s,
federal disability legislation evolved even further,19 eventually leading
toward a recommendation for a broad-scoped prohibition of discrimi-
nation against disabled individuals.2"
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (delegating Title I (employment) regulatory authority to the
EEOC); id. § 12134(a) (delegating Title II (public services) regulatory authority to the
DOJ); id. § 12186(a) (1) (delegating Title III (public accommodations) regulatory author-
ity to the Department of Transportation for the transportation provisions of Title III, and
to the DOJ for all other provisions of Tide III).
14. See DOJ Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in
State and Local Government Services, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A, at 469 (1997) (listing asymp-
tomatic HIV as a condition constituting a physical or mental impairment); EEOC Interpre-
tive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.,
§ 1630.2(j), at 350 [hereinafter EEOC Interpretive Guidance] (stating that HIV infection is
substantially limiting).
15. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984); infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part I.D.
17. See Civil Service Act Amendments of June 10, 1948, ch. 434, 62 Stat. 351 (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7203).
18. See Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.). See generally Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, 64 TEMP. L. Rav. 387 (1991).
19. See Weicker, supra note 18, at 388-89 (referring to various legislative enactments
designed to protect disabled individuals from discrimination).
20. See id. at 389-90 (describing the genesis of the proposed Americans with Disabilities
Act). In 1978, the National Council on the Handicapped of the Department of Health,
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Two years after its introduction in Congress, the ADA was signed
into law in 1990.21 This new federal antidiscrimination statute was
"designed to remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with
disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that
are available to persons without disabilities."22 The ADA was also
designed "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties"23 and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities. '"24
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment
against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. 5 Title I
goes further than any prior civil rights law by obligating an employer
to accommodate an individual's disability so that equal employment
opportunity for the disabled is guaranteed. 6 Reasonable accommo-
dations are, for example, changes to an employee's work schedule or
adjustments in the way a job is ordinarily performed that enable a
disabled employee to compete in the marketplace alongside others
who are not disabled;27 such accommodations cannot, however, place
an undue hardship on the employer.
28
Education and Welfare ("the Council") was established under Title IV of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 780-786 (1994). The National Council on the Handicapped was
redesignated the National Council on Disability on November 7, 1988. See Pub. L. No.
100-630, 102 Stat. 3310 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 780). The Council was respon-
sible for reviewing and making recommendations for the improvement of all federal laws
and programs affecting disabled individuals. In 1986, the Council recommended legisla-
tion that would later become the ADA, observing that "'Congress should enact a compre-
hensive law requiring equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities, with broad
coverage and seeing [sic] clear, consistent, and enforceable standards prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of handicap."' Weicker, supra note 18, at 390 (quoting NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TowARD INDEPENDENCE 18 (1986)).
21. See Weicker, supra note 18, at 387; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., at 347 (1997). Congress has delegated authority to the
EEOC to promulgate regulations under Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994);
see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (1).
24. Id. § 12101 (b)(2).
25. See id. § 12112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individ-
ual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.").
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (A).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
28. See42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A); see also EEOC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 14,
§ 1630.2(p) (stating that an employer need not provide an accommodation that will cause
or require significant difficulty or expense). In making reasonable accommodations, a
disabled employee is still expected to perform the essential functions of his job. Id.
§ 1630.2(o). As the nature and context of employment differs, so must the approach to
making reasonable accommodations. Thus, the ADA requires a case-by-case, individual-
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In establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Title I,
a plaintiff must first establish that he is an individual with a disability.
"Disability" means having "a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individ-
ual,"29 having "a record of such an impairment,"3 or "being regarded
as having such an impairment. 3 1 The ADA does not explicitly dele-
gate to any agency the authority to promulgate regulations interpret-
ing the Act's definition of "disability." The statute, however, does
delegate authority to the EEOC to promulgate regulations to enforce
Title I, and delegates authority to the DOJ to promulgate regulations
to enforce Titles II and Ill.32 In so doing, the statute implicitly autho-
rizes these agencies to interpret the statutory definition of "disability"
in their determination of who qualifies for federal protection.
B. Administrative Regulations
1. EEOC Regulations. -Unlike most administrative regulations
that list certain conditions that are considered impairments under the
ADA,33 the EEOC regulations do not contain such a list. The EEOC
regulations define the phrases "physical or mental impairment,""
ized approach for each determination of whether a disabled employee can be reasonably
accommodated so that he can participate in the world of work:
This case-by-case approach is essential if qualified individuals of varying abili-
ties are to receive equal opportunities to compete for an infinitely diverse range
ofjobs. For this reason, neither the ADA nor this part can supply the "correct"
answer in advance for each employment decision concerning an individual with a
disability. Instead, the ADA simply establishes parameters to guide employers in
how to consider, and take into account, the disabling condition involved.
Id. pt. 1630 app., at 348.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A).
30. Id. § 12102(2) (B).
31. Id. § 12102(2).
32. See supra note 13.
33. Several federal administrative agencies have promulgated regulations governing
complaints of discrimination on the basis of a handicap. These regulations state that
asymptomatic HIV infection is a "physical impairment." See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 1636.103(1)(ii)
(1997) (Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board--defining "physical or mental im-
pairment" to include asymptomatic HIV disease); 7 C.F.R. § 15e.103(1) (ii) (Department of
Agriculture-same); 22 C.F.R. § 1701.103(1)(ii) (Institute of Peace-same); 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.201 (Department of Housing and Urban Development-same); 34 C.F.R.
§ 1200.103(1)(ii) (National Council on Disability-same); 45 C.F.R. § 2301.103(1)(ii)
(Arctic Research Commission-same).
34. "Physical or mental impairment" refers to the following:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), car-
diovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or
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"major life activities,"35 and "substantially limits,"3 6 and discuss what
conditions are covered as "disabilities. 3 7
The EEOC Interpretive Guidance emphasizes that in determin-
ing whether an individual's condition constitutes a disability, there
must be a causal relationship between the physical or mental impair-
ment and the substantial limitation on a major life activity of the
individual:
The ADA and [the EEOC Interpretive Guidance], like
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, do not attempt a "laundry
list" of impairments that are "disabilities." The determina-
tion of whether an individual has a disability is not necessar-
ily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the
person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on
the life of the individual. Some impairments may be disa-
bling for particular individuals but not for others, depending
on the stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other
impairments that combine to make the impairment disa-
bling or any number of other factors. 8
It would seem, therefore, that every plaintiffs condition must be indi-
vidually analyzed to determine her "disability" status. Indeed, for
most conditions, the regulations set forth various factors that must be
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, or-
ganic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
29 C.F.R1 § 1630.2(h).
35. "Major life activities" refers to "functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
36. "Substantially limits" refers to the following:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to
the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the gen-
eral population can perform that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R § 1630.2(0) (1). With regard to working, the term "substantially limits" refers to
the following:
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range ofjobs in various classes as compared to the average person having compa-
rable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job
does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630(j)(3)(i).
37. See EEOC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 14, § 16 30.2(g), at 349.
38. Id. § 1630.2(j), at 350.
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weighed in determining whether a given impairment is substantially
limiting.39
Interestingly, the regulations qualify this case-by-case analysis with
regard to certain conditions that are per se disabling: "Other impair-
ments, however, such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially
limiting. '"40 An impairment that is "inherently substantially limiting"
satisfies the ADA's disability requirement. The EEOC recognizes that
HIV infection will always constitute a disability under the ADA; thus,
according to the EEOC, HIV infection operates, in effect, as a per se
disability.
2. Department of Justice Regulations.-The DOJ is responsible for
enforcing Titles II and III of the Act, which, respectively, prohibit dis-
crimination in public services and in public accommodations. 41 The
DOJ regulations for Title II define physical or mental disability pre-
cisely the same as the EEOC Title I regulations, noted above, except
that the DOJ regulations list certain conditions that are expressly in-
cluded as impairments:
The phrase physical or mental impairment includes, but is not
limited to, such contagious and noncontagious diseases and
conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impair-
ments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple
sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease
(whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addic-
tion, and alcoholism.42
The appendix to the DOJ regulations notes:
It is not possible to include a list of all the specific condi-
tions, contagious and noncontagious diseases, or infections
that would constitute physical or mental impairments be-
cause of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of
such a list, particularly in light of the fact that other condi-
tions or disorders may be identified in the future.4"
Nevertheless, the appendix observes that "the list of examples... in-
cludes: . . . HIV disease (symptomatic or asymptomatic)."'
39. See, e.g., id. § 1630.2(j), at 351 (listing factors to be used in determining if a condi-
tion is "substantially limiting").
40. Id.
41. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12134(a) (1994) (Title II); id. § 12186(a)(1) (Title III); see also
supra note 13.
42. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(4)(1)(ii) (Title II regulations) (second emphasis added).




The regulations explain that while the list of specific conditions
included as impairments is practically identical to those listed in the
Rehabilitation Act regulations,4 5 it was important to include asymp-
tomatic H1V disease specifically within the regulations to ensure
protection:
The phrase "symptomatic or asymptomatic" was inserted
in the final rule after "HIV disease" in response to commen-
tators who suggested the clarification was necessary.
... Following the Arline decision, this Department's Of-
fice of Legal Counsel issued a legal opinion that concluded
that symptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substan-
tially limits a major life activity; therefore it has been in-
cluded in the definition of disability under this part. The
opinion also concluded that asymptomatic HIV disease is an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity,
either because of its actual effect on the individual with HIV
disease or because the reactions of other people to individu-
als with HIV disease cause such individuals to be treated as
though they are disabled.46
These regulations and interpretive guidelines are mirrored in the
DOJ regulations for Title III. 7 The effective result of the DOJ's con-
clusion that "asymptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substan-
tially limits a major life activity"48 is the same as the EEOC's position
that asymptomatic HIV disease operates as a per se disability because
it is inherently a physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of the infected individual.49
C. Judicial Deference to Administrative Regulations
Administrative regulations are entitled to substantial judicial def-
erence so long as such regulations are "not contrary to [the] statute or
specific statutory intent and... [are] reasonable."5" In Chevron U.S.A.
45. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (i).
46. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A, at 469; accord School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987)
(holding that a school teacher who was fired from her job solely because of her susceptibil-
ity to the contagious disease of tuberculosis was a "handicapped individual" within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
47. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (iii) (including asymptomatic HIV disease in the definition of
"physical or mental impairment"); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B, § 36.104, at 610 (listing asymp-
tomatic HIV disease as an example of a physical or mental impairment).
48. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A, at 610.
49. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., § 1630.2(j), at 350.
50. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7
YALEJ. ON REc. 1, 3 (1990) (discussing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
[VOL. 57:558
ASYMPTOMATIC HIV DISEASE
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court ex-
plained this principle in the context of judicial review of administra-
tive agency action: 1
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two ques-
tions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court deter-
mines Congress has not directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the ab-
sence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the stat-
ute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute. 52
Chevron sets forth a two-step analysis to determine the amount of def-
erence courts should give to administrative regulations. In step one, if
the intent of Congress is clear on the precise question at issue, admin-
istrative agencies and courts must give effect to the "unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. '53 However, if Congress has not directly
spoken to a precise issue when enacting a statute, a court must further
inquire, at step two, whether the administrative agency's interpreta-
tion of the issue "is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."5 4
Chevron carefully outlined the relationship between the delega-
tion of authority to an administrative agency by Congress and judicial
review of administrative action that gives meaning to ambiguous statu-
tory language:
"The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created... program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." If Congress has ex-
plicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regu-
lations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
51. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
52. Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).




capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes
the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular ques-
tion is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provi-
sion for a reasonable interpretation made by the administra-
tor of an agency.
5 5
While Congress did not expressly delegate to any administrative
agency the authority to interpret the three statutory definitions of dis-
ability, Congress nevertheless implicitly delegated authority to the
EEOC and the DOJ to "fill in the gap" and interpret these definitions
by regulation.56 The question for the court, therefore, is whether the
EEOC's and the DOJ's interpretations of the definition of disability
are reasonable.57
As the following subpart will demonstrate, not only are the agen-
cies' regulations reasonable, and therefore entitled to substantial def-
erence by the courts, but the regulations are consistent with
Congress's clear and undisputed intent that HIV disease-sympto-
matic or asymptomatic-should be protected as a disability under the
ADA.
55. Id. at 843-44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)) (footnote omit-
ted). See generally 1 KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 3.2 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining the Chevron two-step doctrine).
56. The Fourth Circuit questions the EEOC's regulatory authority to interpret a term
outside of Title I-namely, the definition of "disability" in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). See
Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 59 n.4 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the court is uncertain of the EEOC's authority to define "physical or mental impair-
ment"). Furthermore, the court states that the EEOC's regulatory definition of "disability,"
whether promulgated with legislative authority or not, must comply with the statutory re-
quirement "that the physical or mental impairment substantially limit a major life activity
of the particular individual." Id. at 60 n.4.
Congress has charged the EEOC with issuing regulations to carry out the provisions of
Title I of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116. Thus, the EEOC is responsible for implementing
regulations interpreting the phrase "qualified individual with a disability." Id. § 12111(8).
Because the EEOC must interpret the terms "physical impairment" and "major life activi-
ties" in order to interpret "disability," Congress has implicitly delegated to the EEOC regu-
latory authority on this particular issue.
This implicit delegation of authority is buttressed by the Supreme Court's decision in
School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), where the Court deferred to the Department of
Health and Human Services's (HHS) regulations interpreting, with similar implicit legisla-
tive authority, the terms "physical impairment" and "major life activities" under section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 279-80. These HHS regulations are identical to the
EEOC regulations on this precise issue. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 0) (2) (i), (ii) (HHS regu-
lations interpreting "physical impairment" and "major life activities") with 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h), (i) (EEOC regulations interpreting "physical impairment" and "major life
activities").
57. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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D. Legislative History of the ADA
It was clear at the birth of the ADA that any new federal law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a disability would include
asymptomatic HIV infection as a disability. In 1988, the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic re-
leased its comprehensive report on HIV infection in the United
States.5 8 The Commission analyzed, inter alia, the pervasiveness of
discrimination against HIV-positive individuals.5 9 It further noted the
marked absence of any national mandate against HIV discrimination:
"There is not a societal standard or national policy statement clearly
and unequivocally stating that discrimination against persons with
HIV infection is wrong. There is no comprehensive, national legisla-
tion clearly prohibiting discrimination against persons with HIV infec-
tion as a handicapping condition."6" The Presidential Commission
supported the position that "[s] ection 504 coverage applies to persons
who are HIV positive yet asymptomatic"6 1 and recommended that
"[a]ll persons with symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infection
should be clearly included as persons with disabilities who are covered
by the anti-discrimination protections of this legislation."62
Soon after the release of the Presidential Commission Report, the
issue of whether individuals with asymptomatic HIV infection should
be protected against discrimination reached the Senate floor during
initial debates on the ADA. Republican Senator Lowell P. Weicker,
Jr., of Connecticut, one of the principal architects of the ADA, stated
in mid-1988 that "[t]he job before the President and the Congress is
to remove this obstacle and expand the protections against discrimi-
nation for all those with disabilities, including HIV infection, ARC
[AIDS-related complex], and AIDS."6"
58. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
VIRUS EPIDEMIC (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT].
59. See id. at 119 ("Throughout our investigation of the spread of HIV in the United
States, the Commission has been confronted with the problem of discrimination against
individuals with HIV seropositivity and all stages of HIV infection, including AIDS.").
60. Id. at 120.
61. Id. at 123.
62. Id.
63. 134 CONG. REc. S7212 (daily ed. June 6, 1988) (statement of Sen. Weicker). Sena-
tor Weicker explained further:
The Chairman's recommendations call for the application of existing Fed-
eral handicapped antidiscrimination laws to the private sector to include protec-
tion for all individuals with disabilities, including people with HIV infection, from
losing their jobs, educational opportunities, and homes. This recommendation
comes as no surprise to those of us who are Members of the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee and have repeatedly heard the horror stories of
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In July 1988, Dr. C. Everett Koop, the United States Surgeon Gen-
eral, wrote to Douglas Kmiec, the Acting Assistant Attorney General in
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, regarding the
disabled status of HIV-infected individuals.64 Dr. Koop observed that
discrimination against all HIV-positive individuals must be prohibited,
and that the HIV virus impairs infected individuals at every stage of
infection:
As I sought to emphasize during our meeting, much has
been learned about HIV infection that makes it inappropri-
ate to think of it as composed of discrete conditions such as
ARC or "full blown" AIDS. HIV infection is the starting
point of a single disease which progresses through a variable
range of stages. In addition to an acute flu-like illness, early
stages of the disease may involve subclinical manifesta-
tions[,] i.e., impairments and no visible signs of illness. The
overwhelming majority of infected persons exhibit detecta-
ble abnormalities of the immune system. Almost all, [sic]
HIV infected persons will go on to develop more serious
manifestations of the disease and our present knowledge sug-
gests that all will die of HIV infection barring premature
death from other causes. 65
Dr. Koop concluded that "from a purely scientific perspective, persons
with HIV infection are clearly impaired.... Like a person in the early
stages of cancer, they may appear outwardly healthy but are in fact
seriously ill."66
The following month, the Counsel to President Reagan asked the
Department ofJustice for an opinion concerning whether section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 covered HIV-infected individuals.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Kmiec responded in September
1988, concluding that both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-in-
fected individuals were protected against discrimination under this
discrimination against people with all kinds of disabilities, including HIV infec-
tion, ARC, and AIDS. It was in response to the injustice of discrimination on the
basis of handicap that my good friend, Senator HARRIN and I, along with 14 of my
colleagues, introduced S. 2345, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1988. This
legislation ... will ensure civil rights protections for persons with disabilities, in-
cluding people with HIV infection ....
Id. at S7211-12.
64. Letter from Dr. C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, to
Douglas Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice (July 29, 1988) [hereinafter Surgeon General Letter], reprinted in 2 BERNARD D.
REAMS, JR. ET AL., DIsArILITy LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, PUBLIC LAw 101-336, doc. 14, at 367-68 (1992).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 368.
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federal act so long as they were otherwise qualified. 67 Kmiec specifi-
cally concluded that asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals were
physically impaired under the first prong of the statutory definition,
and that such physical impairment substantially limited asymptomatic
HIV-infected individuals' major life activities.68
Kmiec further observed that asymptomatic HIV infection causes
"'subclinical manifestations"' of impairment, which, while exhibiting
"'no visible signs of illness,"' result in "'detectable abnormalities of
the immune system"' that physically impair the infected individual.69
In addition, the virus's physiological effects on the brain and central
nervous systems resulting in "some form of mental deficiency or brain
dysfunction ... 'before they have any other manifestation such as ARC
or classic AIDS"' also render asymptomatic individuals physically im-
paired.70 Kmiec concluded that asymptomatic HIV infection is physi-
cally impairing to the infected individual "because it is a 'physiological
disorder or condition' affecting the 'hemic and lymphatic' systems. "71
With regard to whether asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals
are substantially limited in their major life activities, the Acting Assis-
tant Attorney General concluded that the major life activities of pro-
creation and intimate personal relations are among the most
important major life activities affected by asymptomatic HLV infection:
Based on the medical knowledge available to us, we be-
lieve that it is reasonable to conclude that the life activity of
procreation-the fulfillment of the desire to conceive and
bear healthy children-is substantially limited for an asymp-
tomatic HIV-infected individual. In light of the significant
risk that the AIDS virus may be transmitted to a baby during
pregnancy, HIV-infected individuals cannot, whether they
are male or female, engage in the act of procreation with the
normal expectation of bringing forth a healthy child. Be-
cause of the infection in their system, they will be unable to
fulfill this basic human desire. There is little doubt that pro-
creation is a major life activity and that the physical ability to
engage in normal procreation-procreation free from the
fear of what the infection will do to one's child-is substan-
67. Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, Department ofJustice, to Arthur B. Culvahouse,Jr., Counsel to the Presi-
dent (Sept. 27, 1988) [hereinafter Legal Counsel Memorandum], reprinted in 2 REAMS, JR.
ET AL., supra note 64, doc. 14, at 338-66.
68. Id. at 343-50.
69. Id. at 345 (quoting Surgeon General Letter, supra note 64, at 367-68).
70. Id. at 345 & n.9 (quoting UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HFALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUR-
GEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 32 (1986)).
71. Id. at 345.
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tially limited once an individual is infected with the AIDS
virus.
This limitation-the physical inability to bear healthy
children-is separate and apart from the fact that asymptom-
atic HIV-infected individuals will choose not to attempt pro-
creation. The secondary decision to forego having children
is just one of many major life decisions that we assume in-
fected individuals will make differently as a result of their
awareness of their infection.72
Related to the limitation on procreation, Kmiec noted, is the substan-
tial limitation on intimate personal relations caused by the HIV
infection:
Similarly, some courts can be expected to find a limitation of
a major life activity in the fact that an asymptomatic HIV-
infected individual's intimate relations are also likely to be
affected by H1V infection. The life activity of engaging in
sexual relations is threatened and probably substantially lim-
ited by the contagiousness of the virus. 71
Kmiec also discussed the Supreme Court's reasoning with regard to
how those with contagious diseases are treated by others.7 4 Basing his
reasoning on the 1987 Supreme Court decision in School Board v. Ar-
line,75 Kmiec argued that under the "regarded as" prong of the statu-
tory definition, an individual infected with a contagious disease is
handicapped based solely on the substantial limitation upon "'that
person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others
to the impairment,"' even if the infected person is not handicapped
himself.76 Therefore, where an HIV-infected individual has been dis-
criminated against on the basis of the "fear of contagion" from that
individual, such person is considered to be within the protected class
under the federal statute.77
The findings of the Surgeon General and the Department of Jus-
tice, as expressed in the Acting Assistant Attorney General's Septem-
ber 1988 memorandum, are the cornerstone upon which Congress
72. Id. at 347-48 (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 348. The letter noted that forbearance of procreation or intimate personal
relations is dependent upon the "conscience and good sense of the person infected," as an
unconscionable person might engage in dangerous behavior by deciding not to forbear
these major life activities. Id.
74. See id. at 349-50.
75. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
76. Legal Counsel Memorandum, supra note 67, at 349 (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at
283). The letter argues that this is significant when the infected individual has decided not
to forbear procreation or intimate personal relations. Id. at 348.
77. Id. at 350.
[VOL. 57:558
1998] ASYMPTOMATIC HIV DISEASE
based its intention to include asymptomatic HIV disease as a disability
under the ADA.78
Congressional opposition to federal protection against HIV-re-
lated discrimination appeared only during the June 1988 floor de-
bates on the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), which
prohibited unlawful housing discrimination on the basis of a handi-
cap.79 It was widely understood by members of Congress that HIV
infection, including asymptomatic HIV infection, qualified as a handi-
cap under the FHAA, which mirrored the language of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.8" On the night that the House of Representatives passed the
FHAA, Republican Representative Dan Burton of Indiana proposed
an amendment that would have excluded from the term "handicap"
"any current infection with the etiological agent for acquired immune
deficiency syndrome."81
Democratic Representative Henry A. Waxman of California rose
in opposition to this amendment, stating that the bill includes HIV
infection, including asymptomatic HIV infection, as a handicap:
Under the provisions of this bill, we will assure that HIV-
infected persons are protected from medically unjustified
discrimination in housing in the same way that they are in
the employment programs covered by the Civil Rights Resto-
ration Act. That is, no discrimination will be permitted
78. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994). The definition of handicap under the FHAA is the
same as the definition of disability under the ADA. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1)
("'Handicap' means, with respect to a person .. . a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities . . . .") with id.
§ 12102(2) ("The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual . . . a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual... ."). Congress for the first time in debates regarding the protective scope of
the FHAA considered whether asymptomatic HIV disease was covered as a handicap.
These debates settled the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV disease was a disability. By
the time Congress debated the ADA, it had resolved that asymptomatic HIV disease was a
unitary entity accorded disability status. See text following infra note 86.
80. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. H4612 (daily ed.June 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Schroe-
der) ("This bill would ensure that [people with AIDS and people infected with HV] have
recourse to the courts in fighting such acts of discrimination."); id. at H4613 (daily ed.
June 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Coelho) ("Most recently our country has witnessed the
horrors of discrimination directed against people with... infectious diseases such as AIDS
and HIV infection. As a society, we cannot tolerate these acts of discrimination. This bill
will provide protection for these individuals and their families in housing."); id. at H4689
(daily ed. June 23, 1988) (statement of Rep. Pelosi) ("All people with disabilities, including
people with ... AIDS or people infected with the human immunodeficiency virus-HIV,
the AIDS virus-would be covered under the three-part definition of handicap adopted in
this bill.").
81. Id. at H4918 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. Burton).
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against persons who pose no direct threat to the health or
safety of others because they pose no significant risk of trans-
mitting the AIDS virus in the kind of normal social interac-
tions which form the context for housing decisions.82
With specific regard to asymptomatic HIV infection, Representative
Waxman stated that "[t]he need to protect asymptomatic HIV-in-
fected persons from housing discrimination is acute."8 3 He explained
that "[a] n asymptomatic HIV-infected person would be covered by at
least two parts of [the Rehabilitation Act's definition of handicap],
and thus would be protected from medically unjustified housing dis-
crimination by this bill."84 He further explained:
First, such a person, although asymptomatic, meets the
criteria for the first category, that is, having a physical impair-
ment which substantially limits a major life activity.
• . . The AIDS virus does far more than "affect" the
hemic system. It destroys essential white blood cells (T-lym-
phocytes or T-helper cells), which are the primary agents for
repelling infection .... Thus, there is from HIV infection
alone, a clear "physical impairment" to at least one major
bodily system.
Moreover, this impairment does substantially limit what
is indisputably a major life activity-procreation and child-
birth. For both men and women, HIV information [sic]
means that one should not engage in sexual intercourse
without use of a condom. Thus, in order to protect one's
partner from a risk of infection, the man or woman who is
infected with the AIDS virus-even if entirely asymptom-
atic-must essentially forego procreation. For women who
are infected with the AIDS virus and already pregnant, the
risk of transmitting the virus to their newborn child may well
mean that many women will decide to obtain abortions.
It is important that Congress take this step of extending
protection against housing discrimination to all HIV-infected
persons, and I am pleased that this bill will have that effect.
This bill represents a historic step forward and I urge my col-
leagues to pass it without any weakening amendments.8 5
82. Id. at H4921 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at H4921-22; accord id. at H4922-23 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Owens) ("It is important to underscore that this definition clearly intends to include per-
sons with AIDS and all who are infected with the HIV virus, whether or not they show
symptoms of the disease.").
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Shortly thereafter, Representative Burton's amendment was defeated
eighty-four to ten.86 No other opposition to the inclusion of asymp-
tomatic HIV disease as a handicap was made during the debates on
the FHAA. When Congress later discussed the scope of the ADA's
protection, no opposition to the inclusion of asymptomatic HIV dis-
ease was made.
The same day that Acting Assistant Attorney General Kmiec re-
leased his memorandum in September 1988,87 Congress held the first
hearing on the ADA. In ajoint hearing before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on the Handicapped of the Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources and the House Committee on Education and Labor,
Democratic Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, a co-spon-
sor of the ADA, hailed the Presidential Commission's Report and an-
nounced that the passage of the ADA will "halt discrimination against
individuals suffering from AIDS or who are infected with the AIDS
virus."88 Senator Kennedy observed that "discrimination against vic-
tims of AIDS is seriously impairing our ability to halt the spread of the
AIDS epidemic, and action by Congress is overdue."89 Also testifying
in this joint hearing was Admiral James Watkins, chairperson of the
Presidential Commission. Admiral Watkins underscored his recom-
mendation that individuals with asymptomatic HIV infection be pro-
tected against discrimination under the ADA: "All persons with
symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infection should be clearly in-
cluded as persons with disabilities who are covered by the anti-discrim-
ination protections of this legislation."9°
Over the next two years, strong support in favor of covering
asymptomatic HIV infection as a disability emerged. California Demo-
cratic Senator Alan Cranston's September 1989 floor statement on
this issue embodied the position of many senators:
The ADA builds on strong legislative, judicial, and adminis-
trative history with regard to coverage of people with AIDS
86. Id. at H4924 (daily ed. June 29, 1988).
87. See Legal Counsel Memorandum, supra note 67.
88. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Subcomm. on
the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on Select
Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. (1988) [hereinafter ADA joint
Hearing on S. 2345] (statement of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in I REAMS, JR. ET AL., supra
note 64, doc. 12, at 18-19.
89. Id. at 19.
90. Id. at 39, 53 (statement of Admiral Watkins, Chairperson of the Presidential Com-
mission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic) (quoting PRESIDENTLAL COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 58, at 123). Admiral Watkins referred to the Report submitted
by the President's Commission on the HIV Epidemic. He incorporated the Report's sec-
tion on discrimination into his formal written statement. Id. at 39.
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and those who are infected with the HIV virus under antidis-
crimination statutes. Consistent with that history, S. 933
would provide .. .that people with AIDS and those who are
infected with the virus are covered under the first prong of
the definition of disability as people with impairments that
substantially limit major life activities.9"
Similarly, the May 1990 comments of Democratic Representative Jim
McDermott of Washington illustrated the general attitude of the
House on the issue of asymptomatic HIV protection under the Act:
I am particularly pleased that this act will finally also extend
necessary protection to people with HIV disease. These are
individuals who have any condition along the full spectrum
of HIV infection-asymptomatic HIV infection, symptomatic
HIV infection or full-blown AIDS. These individuals are cov-
ered under the first prong of the definition of disability in
the ADA, as individuals who have a physical impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. As a physician, I
know that although the major life activity that is affected at
any point along the spectrum by the HIV infection may be
different, an effect on some major life activity exists from the
time of HIV infection.9 2
Even opponents of the ADA understood Congress's intent to
cover asymptomatic HIV infection. Republican Senator Jesse Helms
of North Carolina, an outspoken critic of the legislation, was deeply
troubled with the Act's coverage of HIV-infected individuals, not for
reasons related to the Act's definition of disability but because of his
91. 135 CONG. REc. S10722 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Cranston);
accord id. at S4993 (daily ed. May, 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Beyond the
fundamental issues of fairness and justice for individuals, protections against discrimina-
tion for people with HIV disease are essential to protect the public health."); id. at S10768
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (responding to Sen. Helms, and stat-
ing, "[HIV infected individuals] are covered on the basis of their HIV infection but not on
the basis of being current drug users"); id. (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (emphasizing the need to protect HIV-infected individuals from discrimination
to help curb the spread of the disease); 136 CONG. REC. S9696 (daily ed. July 13, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("People with HIV disease are individuals who have any con-
dition along the full spectrum of HIV infection-[including] asymptomatic HIV infection
.... These individuals who have a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity.").
92. 136 CONG. REc. H2626 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. McDermott);
accord id. at H2442 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Weiss) ("It is of exceptional
significance that this bill will offer protection to the thousands of Americans with HIV
disease-from those who are asymptomatic to those with fully developed AIDS. Persons
living with HIV disease suffer from all the forms of discrimination found in our society.");
id. at H2481 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dymally) (favoring ADA coverage
for individuals with HIV and AIDS).
576 [VOL. 57:558
ASYMPTOMATIC HIV DISEASE
stereotypical view of associating HIV-infected individuals with homo-
sexuals and drug users: "I do not understand why, for example, you
went down the road of including in your definitions people who are
HIV positive, because 85 percent or more of the HIV positive people
in this country are known to be drug users or homosexual or both.""3
Opponents in the House voiced even louder opposition to the
Act's coverage of HIV-infected people. Republican Representative
Dan Burton of Indiana somewhat hysterically warned:
Homosexual lobbyists, AIDS activists, and their Congres-
sional allies in Washington, D.C., realize that a Federal law
which directly prohibits discrimination based on "sexual ori-
entation" or "HIV infection" would be unpalatable to the ma-
jority of Americans and unlikely to pass. Instead, they have
devised a masterpiece of legislative subterfuge which would
effectively achieve their goals without using terms which raise
a red flag in the minds of the public.
Under the cloak of the benign, [a]ffecting title, "The
Americans with Disabilities Act" (ADA), homosexual attor-
neys have helped to draft a bill which would impose massive
fines and oth[e]r coercive legal measures on all private em-
ployers, churches, and private schools who decline to hire an
individual with a "physical or mental impairment, a record of
such impairment, or who is being regarded as having such
an impairment."
The ADA is the last ditch attempt of the remorseless
sodomy lobby to achieve its national agenda before the im-
pending decimation of AIDS destroys its political clout.94
Though they opposed the Act on other grounds, the opposition of
these legislators was premised upon the assumption that the Act was
clearly intended to include asymptomatic HIV infection among the
protected disabilities. Thus, from the beginning, proponents and op-
ponents of the ADA recognized that the Act was intended to cover
individuals who were infected with HIV and not simply those suffering
from AIDS.
More authoritative indicators of congressional intent are the Sen-
ate and House Reports on the ADA, both of which endorse coverage
of asymptomatic HIV infection as a disability under the Act's primary
93. 135 CONG. REc. S10768 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
94. Id. at H6441-42 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Burton); accord 136
CONG. R~c. at H2422 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) (stating his




statutory definition. The Senate Report, issued by the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, fully endorsed the Presidential Com-
mission's recommendation that "'[a]ll persons with symptomatic or
asymptomatic HIV infection should be clearly included as persons
with disabilities who are covered by the anti-discrimination protec-
tions of this legislation. ' ' 9 5
With regard to the "physical or mental impairment" prong of the
disability definition, the Senate Report stated:
It is not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the
specific conditions, diseases, or infections that would consti-
tute physical or mental impairments because of the difficulty
of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list, particularly
in light of the fact that new disorders may develop in the
future. The term includes, however, such conditions, dis-
eases and infections as: ... infection with the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus .... "
In addition, both the House Committee on Education and Labor and
the House Committee on the Judiciary used substantially the same
language in the second and third parts of the House Report to in-
clude HIV infection as a physical or mental impairment.97
With regard to the "major life activities" prong of the definition,
the Senate Report echoed the language of Assistant Attorney General
Kmiec's September 27, 1988 memo in stating that "a person infected
with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under the first
prong of the definition of the term 'disability."'"° The second part of
the House Report elaborated on this conclusion, stating that HIV-in-
fected individuals are considered to be substantially limited in one or
more of their major life activities "because of a substantial limitation
to procreation and intimate sexual relationships."99
While the use of legislative history to aid statutory construction is
controversial,1"' some materials reliably indicate congressional intent.
95. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 19 (1989) (quoting the Presidential Commission on the HIV
Epidemic).
96. Id. at 22.
97. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 51 (1990) (House Committee on Education and
Labor), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332-35; H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 3, at 28
(1990) (House Committee on the Judiciary), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450-51.
98. S. REp. No. 101-116, at 22.
99. H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 52.
100. See generally Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle,
67 S. CAL. L. REv. 585 (1994) (examining the textualism controversy regarding the use of
legislative history and concluding that textualist opposition to the judiciary's use of legisla-
tive history usurps Congress's power to determine the authoritative sources of statutory
interpretation and denigrates Congress as an institution).
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Though the floor statements noted above are suggestive, the state-
ments from sponsors of the ADA, such as Senators Weicker and Ken-
nedy, are clearer indicators. More significant are the committee
reports, which are generally considered to be "the most widely ac-
cepted indicators of Congress' intent."10 1
Finally, most significant is the uncontroverted consensus of both
supporters and opponents of the ADA that asymptomatic HIV infec-
tion was covered as a "disability" under the primary statutory defini-
tion. From the earliest HIV recommendations in Senator Weicker's
1988 National AIDS Policy Recommendations, to the days just prior to
the Act's enactment inJuly 1990, there was no congressional objection
to the many statements indicating that the ADA's passage meant pro-
tection against discrimination for individuals with asymptomatic HIV
disease. Before signing the ADA into law, President Bush, a strong
supporter of federal protection for the disabled, stated:
"Today, I call on the House of Representatives to get on
with the job of passing a law-as embodied in the American
[sic] with Disabilities Act-that prohibits discrimination
agai[n]st those with HIV and AIDS. We're in a fight against
As discussed in Bernard W. Bell's recent article, textualist opposition to the use of
legislative history as a tool of statutory construction argues that its use has harmed the
legislative process in several respects. See Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to
Improve the Legislative Process: Can It Be Done in the Post Chevron Era?, 13J.L. & POL. 105, 110
(1997). It allows legislative minorities to manipulate cleverly the legislative process in their
favor, as well as permits congressional staff members to insert policy in documents that
legislators may not review. Id. at 110-11. It allegedly damages the relationship between the
Congress and the President by giving voice to legislative policies without bicameralism and
presentment. See id. at 111. Textualists also argue that using legislative history discourages
Congress from enacting unambiguous statutes. Id. Textualists, therefore, disavow any judi-
cial reliance on legislative history when interpreting statutes. Id. at 112.
As illustrated in the text above, the problems cited by textualists are not relevant to the
legislative development of the ADA on the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV disease was
intended to be covered as a disability under the primary statutory definition. Instead of
isolated references to this issue, the ADA's legislative history, from its introduction in 1988,
through the House and Senate committee reports, and culminating with the statement of
President Bush just prior to presentment in 1990, see infra text accompanying note 102,
consistently elucidates Congress's recognition and support for covering asymptomatic HIV
disease under the primary statutory definition of disability.
Additionally, Congress's articulated rationale for not expressly including a list of quali-
fying impairments in the statutory text-so as not to limit unintentionally the broad scope
of the Act's coverage-does not indicate sloppy congressional drafting, but instead demon-
strates wise legislative judgment in crafting the remedial civil rights statute.
101. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 201 (1983).
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a disease-not a fight against people. And we won't tolerate
discrimination."10 2
During the years immediately preceding the enactment of the ADA,
every indicator of congressional intent unequivocally pointed toward
the conclusion that individuals with asymptomatic HIV disease were
covered as individuals with a "disability." As federal courts construe
the ADA, the clear and consistent voice of Congress resonating from
the birth of this federal antidiscrimination statute should not be
blithely discounted.
II. CASE LAW RULING ASYMPTOMATIC HIV DISEASE A DISABILITY
In the last decade, many federal courts have considered whether
asymptomatic HIV disease is a disability (or handicap) under either
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, or the ADA.1°3 These
102. 136 CONG. REC. S7444 (daily ed. June 6, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (quoting
Pres. Bush).
103. In Haris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit observed
that while the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV infection itself constitutes a "handicap"
under the Rehabilitation Act "is not entirely settled" in the Eleventh Circuit, id. at 1522,
there "appears to be an emerging consensus on this issue." Id. at 1525 n.46; accord Gonza-
les v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1526 & n.8 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing DOJ
regulations defining disability as including HIV disease), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1822
(1997); Dorsey v. United States Dep't of Labor, 41 F.3d 1551, 1553-54 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that the district court had found that the plaintiffs "HIV-positive status ren-
dered him handicapped within the [Rehabilitation] Act's meaning" and assuming, argu-
endo, that to be true (citing various federal cases)); Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp.
Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 825 (5th Cir. 1990) (assuming, for the purposes of appeal, that
"seropositivity to HIV antibodies is an impairment protected under section 504" of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Doe v. Montgomery Hosp., No. CIV. A. 95-3168, 1996 WL
745524, *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1996) (stating that a reasonable jury could find that asymp-
tomatic HIV infection substantially limits the major life activity of procreation, and there-
fore the HIV-positive plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Bullock v.
Gomez, 929 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that an HIV-infected individual is
an individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins.
Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("A person who is HIV positive or has AIDS
is considered disabled under the ADA." (citing DOJ regulations)); Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F.
Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Pa. 1995) ("Individuals diagnosed as HIV-positive are considered
disabled for purposes of the [ADA], whether they are symptomatic or asymptomatic." (cit-
ing DOJ regulations)); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 319 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("It is
now settled law that HPV-positive individuals are 'disabled' within the meaning of the
ADA." (citing various federal cases)); United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1161
(E.D. La. 1995) (stating that because "AIDS/HIV-positive are both disabilities under the
Department of Justice regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA .... [ilt is beyond
cavil" that the plaintiff is disabled under the ADA); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 170
(D.N.J. 1995) (finding that the plaintiff "is, by virtue of his HIV status, a person with a
disability" under the ADA (citing DOJ regulations)); Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Cor-
rections, 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1465 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that asymptomatic HIV disease
constitutes a "handicap" because "the HIV virus impairs multiple body systems, including
the hemic, lymphatic and reproductive systems, and by its biological effects and the fear it
580
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courts, with the exception of the Fourth Circuit, have unanimously
recognized that asymptomatic HIV disease is covered as a disability.
Despite this general consensus among federal courts, the reason-
ing contained in most of the case law is limited. No case provides a
thorough analysis of whether asymptomatic HIV disease is a disability
under the Act. The practical effect of each court's reasoning, how-
ever, is that asymptomatic HIV disease is always a disability.'" 4
inspires in others, clearly limits those infected in major life activities"); Robinson v. Henry
Ford Health Sys., 892 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (stating that "[i] ndividuals who
have tested positive for AIDS or the AIDS-related HIV virus are covered as handicapped or
disabled individuals" under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA (citing various federal
cases)), affd mem., 86 F.3d 1156 (6th Cir. 1996); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D.
Ohio 1994) (stating that AIDS and HIV infection are both disabilities under the ADA);
Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that the asymp-
tomatic HIV-positive plaintiff "is an 'individual with handicaps' because he has a physical
impairment that substantially limits major life activities such as procreation, sexual contact,
and normal social relationships"), affld per curiam, No. 93-7157, 1994 WL 71547 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 25, 1994); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808
F. Supp. 120, 129-32 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the intense prejudice and discrimination
faced by HIV-positive individuals and persons with AIDS constitutes a substantial limitation
on a major life function under the Rehabilitation Act); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 & n.6 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding
that asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation
Act "due to measurable deficiencies in their immune systems even where disease symptoms
have not yet developed").
104. Part of the problem has been a misreading of School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987), in which the Court held that a person suffering from tuberculosis, a contagious
disease, may be considered a "handicapped person" within the meaning of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 289. The Court rejected the argument that the contagious
nature of tuberculosis could be isolated from the disease itself and provide a lawful basis
upon which to discriminate: "It would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the
distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a
patient and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment." Id. at 282. The Court
stressed that tuberculosis gave rise to a physical impairment and to contagiousness, and the
Court thus found it unnecessary to address the question whether contagiousness alone,
without an underlying physical impairment, may constitute a handicap. Id. at 282 n.7.
The following year in Chalk v. United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988),
the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction to reinstate a teacher
diagnosed with AIDS to classroom duties. Id. at 712. In assessing whether the school-
teacher was handicapped under section 504, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Arline to hold
that section 504 "is fully applicable to individuals who suffer from contagious diseases." Id.
Because AIDS is a contagious disease, the schoolteacher was found to be handicapped. Id.
The Ninth Circuit made no finding of any underlying physical impairment caused by
AIDS.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Arline in Chalk was reiterated in Gates v. Rowland,
39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994), in which the court held that prisoners living with asymptom-
atic HIV disease were disabled under section 504:
In this case, as in Chalk, the physical impairment to the individual is not the issue,
but rather the issue is the contagious effect of the HIV virus. Thus, there is no
distinction to be drawn, for purposes of the Act, between those persons in whom
the HIV virus has developed into AIDS and those persons who have remained
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What follows is a review of the reasoning from five cases that offer
the most complete, albeit still limited, analysis of this issue. Each case
stands for the proposition that the Act protects individuals with
asymptomatic HIV disease from discrimination in employment. The
cases generally conclude that HIV always impairs individuals' hemic
systems and always limits their sexual intimacy and reproduction.
A. Pre-ADA Cases
In Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District,1"5 a federal district
court in California found an HIV-positive child handicapped under
the Rehabilitation Act, and ordered a school district to allow the child
to attend regular kindergarten classes. 10 6 The court observed:
A range of symptoms may result from infection with the
AIDS virus which have been classified by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control ("CDC") into four groups of symptoms: (I)
early acute, though transient, signs of the disease; (II) asymp-
tomatic infection; (III) persistent swollen lymph-nodes; and
(IV) presence of opportunistic disease and/or rare types of
cancer ....
... Individuals in all four of the CDC classifications suf-
fer from impairments to their physical systems. Persons in-
fected with the AIDS virus suffer significant impairments of
their major life activities. People infected with the AIDS vi-
rus may have difficulty caring for themselves, performing
manual tasks, . . . learning and working, among other life
functions. Even those who are asymptomatic have abnormal-
ities in their hemic and reproductive systems making procre-
ation and childbirth dangerous to themselves and others. 107
Thus, the court ruled that asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are
handicapped under the language of the Rehabilitation Act,"' 8 render-
ing asymptomatic HIV infection, in effect, a per se disability.
asymptomatic. It is the possible transmission of the virus to others that is the basis
of the individual's disability under the provisions of the Act.
Id. at 1446. However, the Ninth Circuit's reading of Arline is not accurate. Arline held that
a person suffering from tuberculosis was disabled because of the physical impairment
caused by the disease and the substantial limitation on a major life activity caused by the
contagious effects of the disease. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 & n.7. Notwithstanding the
Ninth Circuit's misinterpretation, because HIV disease is a physical impairment, an accu-
rate reading of Arline would construe the Act to cover individuals living with asymptomatic
HIV disease.
105. 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
106. Id. at 381.
107. Id. at 379.
108. Id. at 381.
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In Cain v. Hyatt,10 9 a federal district court in Pennsylvania ruled
in favor of a plaintiff with AIDS who brought an action under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,' 10 which employs a disability stan-
dard identical to the Rehabilitation Act."1 After initially noting the
"consensus of opinion" among numerous federal courts and two-
thirds of states that qualify AIDS as a handicap under federal and state
antidiscrimination laws,' 12 the court recognized that AIDS cannot be
isolated as an independent phase of HIV disease: "H1V-seropositivity,
AIDS-related complex (ARC), and AIDS form a spectrum of related
conditions."" 3 In all of the disease's stages, the court found that the
virus damages white blood cells, including lymphocytes, thereby caus-
ing a physiological disorder of the hemic and lymphatic systems." 4
The court went on to say that this limits reproduction, because HIV is
transmitted through sexual intercourse. 115 The court concluded that
"this significant injury to the reproductive system impedes a major life
activity." '16 The court's reasoning supports the argument that any
109. 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
110. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-963 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).
111. Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 676-77.
112. Id. at 678.
113. Id. at 679.
114. Id. (citing Doe v. Dolton Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill.
1988)).
115. Id.
116. Id. The court also discussed at length the impact that social prejudice has upon the
major life activities of an infected individual:
[S]ince first identified in the early 1980s as a distinct medical condition, AIDS has
engendered such prejudice and apprehension that its diagnosis typically signifies
a social death as concrete as the physical one which follows....
... The pervasive anxiety that AIDS is easily transmitted converges with and
often ostensibly justifies the disapprobation of AIDS victims. Societies long have
entertained bizarre conceptions about the etiology of illness and interpreted the
contraction of disease, including cancer, as punishment for moral turpitude. The
particular associations AIDS shares with sexual fault, drug use, social disorder,
and with racial minorities, the poor, and other historically disenfranchised groups
accentuates the tendency to visit condemnation upon its victims.
AIDS mythology has fomented riot only private judgments about carriers of
the virus. It has spawned calls for punitive, oppressive official action against them
"in every public forum and institution in this society, in virtually every context
imaginable." Vast segments of the American populace favor the forced quaran-
tine of persons with AIDS, tattooing HIV-positive persons for ready identification,
and banishing HIV carriers from the workplace and school. Thus, to conclude
that persons with AIDS are stigmatized is an understatement; they are widely ster-
eotyped as indelibly miasmic, untouchable, physically and morally polluted.
These and related prejudices substantially curtail the major life activities of
AIDS victims. They are shunned socially and often excluded from public life. As
the Supreme Court has observed [in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284
(1987)], "[ S] ociety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are
as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."
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HIV-infected individual qualifies as disabled, because such an individ-
ual suffers a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.
B. Post-ADA Cases
The issue reappeared in a Pennsylvania federal district court in
Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf P.C.1 1 7 In discussing the debilitating effects
of HIV infection on the body, the court noted that the virus's physio-
logical impact might not be readily observable to the lay eye."' Nev-
ertheless, the court stressed that while lay observers would not regard
such individuals as "disabled," the court's role "is not to construe the
statute so that it might conform with a lay perception." ' Rather, the
court "must read with care the definitions of disability that Congress
and the EEOC... gave [it], and decide whether this plaintiff's disease
and its symptoms fall within one or more of those express statutory
and regulatory definitions, as anomalous as the statutory result might
seem to some."120
The court found that the plaintiff's HIV infection constituted a
physical impairment because "HIV itself 'creates a physiological disor-
der of the hemic (blood) and lymphatic systems,"' which constitutes
an impairment under the EEOC regulations. 121 The court further
found that an HIV-infected individual is substantially limited in her
ability to procreate, which, as this court determined, is a major life
activity under the ADA.1 2 2 Because Congress determined that the ma-
jor life activity that may be substantially limited need not be one that is
relevant only to the workplace, "the language of the statute does not
preclude procreating as a major life activity, but may well include
it."1 23 Therefore, this court's reasoning again indicates that any HIV-
infected individual qualifies because the virus limits procreation.
The most thorough analyses of this issue are found in two 1996
opinions, which, although differing with regard to whether asymptom-
atic HIV is a per se disability, found that asymptomatic HIV infection
Id. at 679-80 (citations omitted).
117. 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
118. Id. at 1319-20.
119. Id. at 1319.
120. Id. at 1319-20. The court gave substantial deference to the EEOC regulations im-
plementing Tide I of the ADA, especially with regard to the "physical impairment" and
"substantially limits a major life activity" components. Id. at 1319-21.
121. Id. at 1320 (quoting Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990)).
122. Id.
123. Id. The court noted that the legislative history supports including procreation as a
major life activity substantially limited by HIV infection. Id. at 1320 n.7.
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always constitutes a physical impairment that substantially limits a ma-
jor life activity of the infected individual. 124 In Anderson v. Gus Mayer
Boston Store,125 a federal district court in Texas declared asymptomatic
HIV infection to be a per se disability under the ADA. 1 26 "Conditions
such as AIDS, HIV, blindness, and deafness, inter alia, have been deter-
mined by the courts to be per se disabilities. In other words, it has
been established both that these conditions impact a major life activity
and that this impact is substantially impairing of a given activity."127
The court stated that HIV infection substantially limited an individ-
ual's major life activities of procreation, 128 engagement in intimate
sexual relationships,' 29 and the ability to "travel freely." 30
The court posited a three-level evaluation to determine whether a
given condition constitutes a disability under the ADA:
[S]ome conditions have been established through regula-
tions and case law to be per se disabilities. If a condition has
not been established to be a per se disability, an individual
attempting to classify a condition is not lost in the wilderness.
Rather, regulations and case law have consistently main-
tained that the concepts of "disability" and "major life activi-
ties" are to use precedent established under the
Rehabilitation Act as a guide.
... If neither the EEOC regulations nor the case law has
found a condition to be a per se disability, then the court is
left to the three-part test for disability found in
§ 12102(2).' M
The Anderson court concluded that HIV-seropositivity constituted a
per se disability,132 a conclusion it noted was supported by the Act's
legislative history, the EEOC and DOJ regulations, numerous federal
court decisions, and several academic articles.' 33
124. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-41 (st Cir.), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct.
554 (1997); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 774 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
125. 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
126. 924 F. Supp. at 777.
127. Id. at 774-75 (footnotes omitted).
128. Id. at 774 & n.24.
129. Id. at 774 n.24.
130. Id. at 777 n.37. The court explained the bearing on the ability to travel freely:
"[A]symptomatic HIV-positive individual[s] can not travel freely [because they] must be
always mindful of exposure to bacterial infection and fungi or even places requiring vac-
cinations." Id.
131. Id. at 775. The court in Anderson "greatly relied upon" the EEOC regulations for
guidance on the issue of which conditions establish a per se disability. See id. at 774 nn.20,
22 (citing Bolton v. Scriver, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1994)).
132. See id. at 777.
133. See id. at 774 nn.24-25, 777 nn.36 & 38.
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In Abbott v. Bragdon,"' the First Circuit affirmed summary judg-
ment in favor of an individual with asymptomatic HIV who com-
plained about a dentist's refusal to provide her treatment in the
dentist's office. 11 5 The court ruled that asymptomatic HIV infection
constituted a disability under the ADA because HIV is an impairment
that substantially limits reproduction.1"6
At trial, the district court examined "the vast weight of authority"
on this issue and stated that it was "persuaded that asymptomatic HIV
constitutes a physical impairment for the purposes of the ADA." '37
The district court further concluded that the plaintiffs condition sub-
stantially limited her major life activities of reproduction: "Reproduc-
tion, one of the most fundamental of human activities, must
constitute a major life activity .... [T]he interests in conceiving and
raising one's own children have been recognized as essential and basic
civil liberties."13' The court explained: "Reducing reproduction to
the specific act of conception ignores the processes that occur contin-
ually in both male and female reproductive systems in order to
achieve conception. Limitation of reproduction to conception also
ignores the process of raising and caring for offspring upon which
successful reproduction depends." '39
The district court stressed that "[c] hild birth poses a risk of physi-
cal harm to an asymptomatic HIV mother," and that "an HIV positive
mother runs the risk of infecting her child, during pregnancy,
134. 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
135. Id. at 937. The dentist agreed to treat her only in a hospital setting. Id.
136. Id. at 949.
137. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 585 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st
Cir.), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
138. Id. at 586 (citations omitted).
139. Id. (citation omitted). The court discussed at some length the ongoing controversy
regarding whether procreation or reproduction constitutes a major life activity under the
ADA. Id. Compare Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
("Since time immemorial, people have procreated, not as a lifestyle choice, but as an inte-
gral part of life. In fact, to call working a major life activity, but to deny the same status to
reproduction, seems ludicrous."), Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and
Univs., 911 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that reproduction is a major life
activity) and Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("There is no gainsaying
that [HIV's] significant injury to the reproductive system impedes a major life activity.")
with Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
reproduction is not a major life activity) and Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F.
Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995) ("Reproduction is not an activity engaged in with the same
degree of frequency as the listed activities of walking, seeing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working. A person is required to walk, see, learn, speak, breath [e], and work through-
out the day, day in and day out. However, a person is not called upon to reproduce
throughout the day, every day." (citation omitted)), affid mem., 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir.
1996).
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through child birth or, if she chooses to do so, through breast feed-
ing."14 The court reasoned that the major life activity of procreation
is also not only a single, isolated act; in actuality, "reproduction ex-
tends beyond the act of conception and the period of gestation, to the
process of caring for and raising a child."' 4 1
On appeal, the First Circuit spent little time disposing of the
question whether asymptomatic HIV was an impairment under the
Act. The court simply stated that EEOC regulations, judicial author-
ity, and the dentist's apparent acquiescence supported its conclusion
that asymptomatic HIV was an impairment.1
42
The court resolved the issue whether asymptomatic HIV substan-
tially limits major life activities in general, indicating that this issue "is
not free from doubt."1 43 In resolving the issue, the court noted that
an individual's "ability to engage in intimate sexual activity, gestation,
giving birth, childrearing, and nurturing familial relations" is recog-
nized as fundamentally important in our culture, a recognition that is
reflected in American jurisprudence. 144
The court looked to the statute itself, along with regulations im-
plementing the Act, and located further support for its finding that
HIV substantially limits reproduction. 145 Primarily, noting that the
Act itself does not define "major life activities," the court recognized
its obligation to interpret the Act to be consistent with the legislature's
will and turned to the "natural" meaning of "major life activities. 1 4 6
The court noted that the dictionary definition of the word "major"
denotes "comparative importance.' 47 The court concluded that "re-
production, which is both the source of all life and one of life's most
important activities, easily qualifies."1 48 The court buttressed this con-
clusion by stating "[i]t would be wholly inconsistent with [the legisla-
140. Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 587 (citation omitted).
141. Id. It is interesting that the court stated that in finding reproduction or procrea-
tion to be a major life activity substantially impaired by HIV infection, the plaintiff does not
have to show that her reproductive impairment has rendered her infertile: "The statutory
language... does not require such a stringent inquiry. By requiring an individual's physi-
cal or mental impairment to substantially limit a major life activity, the statute does not
contemplate a complete inability of that individual to engage in a particular major life
activity." Id. at 587.







148. Id. at 940.
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ture's transplanting of the phrase 'major life activities' from the
Rehabilitation Act into the ADA] to hold that Congress did not envi-
sion reproduction as a major life activity." '149
Finally, the court looked to the regulations implementing the
Act. Although the list of major life activities contained in the EEOC's
regulations do not include reproduction, the court emphasized that
the regulations expressly state that the enumerated life activities are
not exclusive.1 5 ' The court concluded that not only does reproduc-
tion "fit[ ] comfortably within [the] sweep" of the listed life activities,
the inclusion of physiological disorders affecting reproduction within
that portion of the regulations defining impairments indicated that
Congress intended reproduction to be a major life activity.15 1
The First Circuit also addressed the issue whether the impair-
ment that substantially limits a major life activity must be shown specif-
ically to limit the plaintiffs major life activity of reproduction.152 The
dentist had argued that the facts of this case raised a genuine issue
whether the plaintiffs ability to procreate was substantially limited,
because deposition evidence indicated that the plaintiff had denied
that her HIV disease limited any of her life activities. 153
In addressing this argument, the court noted that no evidence
exists that "Congress intended either frequency or universality to op-
erate as a restriction on the definition of 'major life activities.' 154 By
way of example, the court stated that not everyone engages in learn-
ing and working-both of which are major life activities enumerated
in the EEOC's relevant regulations 1 5 5-and that most acts performed
by individuals have elements of volition (e.g., although all monks can
speak, some monks take vows of silence).56
The court conceded that the ADA's definition of disability as an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity requires "an
individualized inquiry into whether the plaintiff is disabled. 1 57 How-
ever, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the First Circuit indicated that such a
"case-by-case analysis of disability does not necessarily require a corre-









157. Id. (citing, among other cases, Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53
F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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tiff and the major life activity."1 5 8 The court, however, deferred
answering this question, because it concluded that the record re-
vealed no genuine dispute about whether the plaintiff's HIV-seroposi-
tive status substantially limited her desire to procreate.
159
The Fourth Circuit stands alone in its refusal to apply the Act's
protection to individuals with asymptomatic HIV disease. Both the
Ninth Circuit and the First Circuit have stated that asymptomatic HIV
disease is a disability.'" ° Each federal district court outside the Fourth
Circuit discussing the issue has similarly regarded asymptomatic HIV
disease to be a disability or handicap.' 61 Courts outside the Fourth
Circuit have reached uniform conclusions by employing unsophistica-
ted analyses, but analytical sophistication is unnecessary once courts
acknowledge the virus's inescapable effect on an individual's hemic or
lymphatic systems and recognize that sexual activity is accepted as one
of life's most important activities.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S TREAmENw OF HIV DISEASE
As discussed above, Congress intended asymptomatic HIV infec-
tion to be protected as a disability under the ADA. However, the
Fourth Circuit disagrees.' 62 The Fourth Circuit's disagreement is
rooted in its opinion that under the ADA, there are no per se disabili-
ties. According to the Fourth Circuit, each individual condition must
undergo an independent, case-by-case analysis of whether the condi-
158. Id.
159. Id. at 941-42. The plaintiff clearly stated in her deposition that she decided not to
procreate because of her H1V-positive status, and the defendant had no "substantial rebut-
tal." Id. at 942. Nonetheless, the court stated that it might be enough to find that HIV
asymptomatic disease is a disability by showing only that the impairment substantially limits
the plaintiffs ability to procreate without showing that the plaintiff herself considered pro-
creation important. Id. at 942.
160. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554
(1997); Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
161. In Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1995), after stating that the ADA
prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in the enjoyment of public accommoda-
tions, id. at 319, DistrictJudge Thomas Selby Ellis, III, stated that "it is now settled law that
HIV-positive individuals are 'disabled' within the meaning of the ADA." Id. at 319 n.7
(citing various federal courts outside the Fourth Circuit).
162. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (Runnebaum II) (holding that Runnebaum failed to provide sufficient evidence to
show that he was disabled under the ADA); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio,
53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that Ennis failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA).
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tion is physically impairing and whether the impairment substantially
limits one or more of the individual's major life activities."'
163. The Fourth Circuit's individualized-inquiry rule originated in Forrisi v. Bowen, 794
F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986). In Forisi, the plaintiff suffered from acrophobia, a fear of
heights, and he argued to his employer that without reasonable accommodation, he could
not perform the essential functions of his job, which included climbing stairways and lad-
ders. Id. at 933. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that, when examining whether a
plaintiff has established that he is handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act, the statute requires an individualized assessment by the court:
The question of who is a handicapped person under the Act is best suited to a
"case-by-case determination," as courts assess the effects of various impairments
upon varied individuals. The definitional task cannot be accomplished merely
through abstract lists and categories of impairments. The inquiry is, of necessity,
an individualized one-whether the particular impairment constitutes for the
particular person a significant barrier to employment.
Id. (citations omitted).
Forris's individualized-inquiry rule relies upon E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp.
1088 (D. Haw. 1980), for support. In E.E. Black, the court rejected an administrative law
judge's interpretation that the Rehabilitation Act covered an individual whose impairment
was "likely to affect his employability generally." Id. at 1099. The court believed that requir-
ing an impairment to affect an individual's overall employability "drastically reduce[d]"
coverage of the Act and undercut the Act's remedial purpose. Id. The court declared that
the Rehabilitation Act's definitions were "personal" and must be evaluated with regard to
the individual, so that the scope of the individual's employability is focused upon his cho-
sen field, not his employability generally. Id.
The Forrisi court applied E.E. Black's individualized-inquiry rule to an employee who
was discharged from a single job because of a single requirement of employment. Forrisi,
794 F.2d at 935. In the Forfisi court's view, an "isolated mismatch of employer and em-
ployee" should not result in that employee being regarded as handicapped; the inability to
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation of the individ-
ual's ability to work. Id.
Subsequent decisions by other federal courts have followed Forris's "isolated mis-
match" analysis, and have declined to find a plaintiff handicapped because of his inability
to perform a single, particular job. See, e.g., Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718,
723-24 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[A] person found unsuitable for a particular position has not
thereby demonstrated an impairment substantially limiting such person's major life activity
of working. . . ." (citing, among other cases, Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 935)); Byrne v. Board of
Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1992) ("It is well established that an inability to perform
a particular job for a particular employer is not sufficient to establish a handicap; the im-
pairment must substantially limit employment generally." (citations omitted)). These
courts instead weigh various factors to determine "whether the particular impairment con-
stitutes for the particular person a significant barrier to employment." Forrisi, 794 F.2d at
933. The relevant factors are (1) "the number and types of jobs from which the impaired
individual is disqualified," (2) "to what geographical area the [individual] has reasonable
access," and (3) the individual's "own job expectations and training." E.E. Black, 497 F.
Supp. at 1100-01. Federal courts have also interpreted Forniss rule to protect conditions
that are not commonly recognized as disabilities, but which still constitute a physical im-
pairment that substantially limits a major life activity of the individual See, e.g., Perez v.
Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 677 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding a plaintiff with
a severe lumbosacral sacroiliac sprain with radiculopathy to be handicapped within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, despite the employer's argument that the condition was
not a recognized handicap), aff'd mere., 841 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1988).
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The Fourth Circuit first articulated its position on asymptomatic
HIV disease in Ennis v. National Ass'n of Business & Educational Ra-
dio."6 In April 1990, the National Association of Business and Educa-
tional Radio (NABER) hired the plaintiff, Joan Ennis, as a
bookkeeping clerk.1 65 Three years later, Ennis's supervisor reviewed
Ennis's personnel file and found that it "demonstrated an unaccept-
able level of performance" and terminated her employment.'
6 6
Ennis filed suit under Title I of the ADA, alleging that NABER
terminated her employment because of her known association with
her asymptomatic HIV-positive adopted son, A.J.' 6 7 Specifically, Ennis
alleged that NABER terminated her employment to avoid the possibil-
ity of a "catastrophic impact" that A.J.'s illness might have upon
NABER's insurance rates.'6 8 NABER moved for summary judgment,
arguing that "Ennis' discharge was in no way related to her son's con-
dition or its insurance coverage, but solely the consequence of her
poor work performance."' 6 9 The United States District Court for the
164. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
165. Id. at 56. NABER provides a service called "frequency coordination." Upon receipt
of frequency coordination applications, the mailroom separates the checks and payment
information from the applications and sorts them into "batches" of 10 to 20, and then
sends them to bookkeeping for entry. Bookkeeping's function is critical to NABER's oper-
ations, because applications cannot be processed until the payment information is entered.
In the fall of 1992, Ennis's immediate supervisor instructed her to enter each day at least
two batches of payment information for each of NABER's five divisions. In January 1993,
Ennis was suspended after unprocessed payment information left idle other NABER de-
partments depending on Ennis to enter the data. Ennis's personnel file, already replete
with reports of "inaccuracies in data entry, excessive socializing, excessive personal phone
calls, and tardiness," contained a memorandum warning that Ennis's employment may be
terminated without notice should Ennis violate her job duties once more. Id.
166. Id. at 57.
167. Id. at 56-57. A.J. was born HIV-positive and addicted to "crack" cocaine in 1988.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Ennis (No. 94-1585). The ADA prohibits employers from
taking adverse employment action "because of the known disability of an individual with
whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association." Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (4) (1994). The EEOC implementation
guidelines state in pertinent part: "It is unlawful for a covered entity to exclude or deny
equal jobs or benefits to, or otherwise discriminate against, a qualified individual because
of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to
have a family, business, social or other relationship or association." 29 C.F.R- § 1630.8
(1997). The EEOC regulations explain that, for example, "this provision would prohibit
an employer from discharging an employee because the employee does volunteer work
with people who have AIDS, and the employer fears that the employee may contract the
disease." 29 C.F.R pt. 1630 app., § 1630.8, at 360.
168. Ennis, 53 F.3d at 57.
169. Id.
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Eastern District of Virginia granted NABER's motion for summary
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. 170
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, because
the plaintiff failed to show that she was adequately performing her job
and that she was terminated as a result of discrimination. 171 The
court ruled that in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion under the ADA, Ennis had to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) that she was a member of a protected class, (2) that she
was discharged, (3) that she was adequately performing her job at the
time of discharge, and (4) that her discharge "occurred under circum-
stances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimina-
tion."' 72 With regard to the first requirement, Ennis sought to qualify
as a member of a protected class not because of any disability she may
have had, but because of her known association with a disabled indi-
vidual-specifically, her son AJ.173
Ennis argued that because A.J. was HIV positive, he was "dis-
abled" under the ADA: "A.J. Ennis is HIV-positive. He is, accordingly,
a person with a 'disability' under the ADA, whether or not his HIV
infection has progressed to AIDS or AIDS-related complex."1 74 A.J.,
170. Id. The district court found that the McDonnell Douglas Tide VII burden-shifting
framework applied to Ennis's ADA claim. The court stated, however, that although Ennis
had established a prima facie case of discrimination, she failed to present sufficient evi-
dence that NABER's explanation for why it terminated Ennis's employment was a pretext
for employment discrimination. Id.
171. Id. at 62.
172. Id. at 58.
173, Id. at 59.
174. Appellant's Opening Brief at 22-23, Ennis (No. 94-1585) (footnote omitted). For
support, Ennis cited T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110 (D. Utah 1993), which granted
injunctive relief under the ADA in favor of those with "AIDS, and those with the HIV
disease," id. at 111, intimating that HIV-positive individuals who have not developed AIDS
but remain asymptomatic were within the protected class-that is, disabled under the
ADA. Appellant's Opening Brief at 23, Ennis (No. 94-1585). Ennis buttressed this sole
ADA decision with strong support from the ADA's legislative history, which emphasized
that HIV-infected individuals suffer from "an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity, and thus are considered disabled under this first test of the [ADA] definition."
Id. at 23-24 (citing H.R REP. No. 101-485 pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451); accord supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. Additionally, En-
nis cited numerous decisions holding that asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals were "dis-
abled" under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including a District of Columbia federal court
decision that recounted the physical impact HIV has upon an infected, albeit asymptom-
atic, individual. Appellant's Opening Brief at 24-26, Ennis (No. 94-1585) (citing Leckelt v.
Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989), affd, 909 F.2d
820 (5th Cir. 1990); Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Thomas v.
Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Local 1812, American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987)).
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Ennis argued, "has without question experienced interference with
normal social relationships and other normal life activities" and "suf-
fers from notable impairment in the performance of many of his life
functions, including limitations on playing and recreation, solely due
to his asymptomatic HIV status.
175
In response, NABER argued that neither the ADA nor any court
recognized per se disabilities. 176 NABER insisted that the ADA re-
quired an individual assessment of whether an individual's condition
constituted a "substantial impairment.1 77 Such an individualized as-
sessment, NABER argued, would be in accord with the fundamental
premise of the ADA "that such matters are to be determined on a[n]
individual basis, rather than through generalized conjecture, supposi-
tion, or stereotyping."'
7 8
According to NABER, "[t] here [was] no fact in this record which
show[ed] that AJ. Ennis [was] impaired, to any degree, or . .. suf-
fer[ed] a limitation on any major life activity. " 17' NABER noted that
A.J. had been hospitalized once and that Ennis admitted that he suf-
fered no "ailments."18 ° Therefore, NABER concluded, "[b]ut for a
latent blood condition, A.J. Ennis . . . live[d] a normal child's life,"
and although A.J. probably would develop AIDS in the future, "there
[was] simply no evidence in the record that he [was] disabled [at the
time of his mother's discharge]."181
The Fourth Circuit agreed that the ADA required an individual-
ized assessment of whether an individual's condition constituted a dis-
ability within the meaning of the Act:
We believe that the plain language of the provision requires
that a finding of disability be made on an individually-indi-
vidual basis. The term "disability" is specifically defined, for
each of subparts (A), (B), and (C), "with respect to [the]
individual" and the individualized focus is reinforced by the
175. Appellant's Opening Brief at 26 & n.29, Ennis (No. 94-1585). Ennis commented
that A.J. was hospitalized when he had chicken pox (an otherwise mild childhood disease),
that on several occasions A.J. could not breathe on his own, and that Virginia considers A.J.
to be a "special needs" child. Id. at 26 n.29.
176. Brief of Appellee at 19, Ennis (No. 94-1585).
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILmEs
AcT 11-10 (1992) (listing three circumstances in which an individual would be considered
to have a substantial impairment)); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
179. Brief of Appellee at 19, Ennis (No. 94-1585).
180. Id. at 20.
181. Id. NABER also argued that there was no evidence that A.J. was regarded as dis-
abled under the second prong of the ADA disability test. Id.
1998]
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requirement that the underlying impairment substantially
limit a major life activity of the individual'82
The court found that there was no evidence in the record that A.J., as
an asymptomatic HIV-positive child, "was impaired, to any degree, or
that he... endured any limitation, much less a substantial limitation,
on any major life activity."18
The Fourth Circuit concluded that in light of the lack of evidence
in the record, if it were to hold that A.J. was disabled, they "would
have to conclude that HIV-positive status is per se a disability."' 84 How-
ever, continued the court, "[t] he plain language of the [ADA], which
contemplates case-by-case determinations of whether a given impair-
ment substantially limits a major life activity.., simply would not per-
mit this[ ] conclusion."' 85
Ennis's rejection of asymptomatic HIV disease as a per se disabil-
ity under the ADA and its finding that the plaintiff s asymptomatic son
was neither physically impaired nor substantially limited in a major
life activity were dicta, and, therefore not controlling authority. Nev-
ertheless, in Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N.A. (Runnebaum
1),186 the Fourth Circuit cited Ennis as controlling authority for hold-
ing that asymptomatic HIV disease is not a per se disability.' 87 The
court also relied on Ennis for its proposition that a finding of disability
must be made on an individualized basis; that is, under the first statu-
tory definition, the plaintiffs asymptomatic HIV disease must (1)
physically impair the individual, and (2) substantially limit one of his
major life activities.' 88
In June 1991, NationsBank hired William Runnebaum, a man liv-
ing with asymptomatic HIV disease, to work in its private banking de-
182. Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 59 (4th Cir. 1995). The
court relied upon Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986), which required indi-
vidualized inquiry under the Rehabilitation Act, and various cases citing Forrisi for author-
ity. See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60 (citing Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1396 (5th Cir.
1993) (citing Forrisi's individualized inquiry requirement under the Rehabilitation Act);
Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 564-65 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Welsh v. City of
Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Southern Manage-
ment Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 918 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Forrisi's individualized inquiry re-
quirement under the Fair Housing Act)).
183. Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60.
184. Id.
185. Id. The Fourth Circuit nonetheless assumed that A.J.'s condition satisfied the ADA
disability requirement because the summary judgment record as to any limitations, actual
or perceived, on his major life functions may not have been fully developed. Id.
186. 95 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1996) (Runnebaum 1), rev'd en banc, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir.
1997) (Runnebaum I).




partment; one year later, NationsBank promoted him into its trust
department.1 8 9 In the fall of 1992, Runnebaum was responsible for
planning an important client reception. 190
In September 1992, Runnebaum confidentially informed the
trust department manager that he was HIV positive, because he was
concerned that the bank's employee health plan might not cover the
cost of his HIV-related medication. 9 ' The manager "panicked" when
he heard this news.'9 2 In November, Runnebaum began receiving
shipments of AZT at work, some of which were inadvertently opened
by bank employees.' 93 In December, Runnebaum invited his gay part-
ner to the bank's holiday reception and introduced his partner to his
supervisor as his "boyfriend."' 94
By the end of 1992, Runnebaum had brought in nearly $5 million
in assets to NationsBank, generating $21,900 in fees.' 9 5 Runnebaum's
fees, however, fell below his $40,000 sales target.'96 Less than a month
later, he was fired.' 97 Meanwhile, another employee who was hired
contemporaneously with Runnebaum and given the same sales target
also failed to meet his goal, generating only $2750 in fees.' 98 Never-
theless, this employee retained his position at NationsBank.' 99
Runnebaum filed suit against NationsBank in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging discriminatory
treatment under the ADA.20 ' The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of NationsBank on the basis that Runnebaum had
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA
or, in the alternative, that Runnebaum had failed to establish that Na-
tionsBank's purported reasons for firing him were pretextual.20 1 Run-
nebaum appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
202
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding, inter
alia, that there existed a genuine dispute of material fact on the ques-
189. Id. at 1287-88.















fion whether Runnebaum was disabled under the ADA.2" 3 The court
stated that although "[s]everal courts have held that asymptomatic
HIV infection is a disability per se," '204 and although "[s] everal federal
agencies have reached the same conclusion,"2 5 "[w] e rejected this ap-
proach [in Ennis], where we concluded that § 12102(2) 'requires that
a finding of disability be made on an [individualized] basis.'"2°6 The
court reiterated that a finding of disability under the ADA "contem-
plates case-by-case determinations. "207
The court stated that Runnebaum, "though asymptomatic," prof-
fered sufficient evidence that he was regarded as having a disability
under the third statutory definition of disability.2 8 This finding im-
plies that if Runnebaum had not proffered evidence that he was per-
ceived as having a disability, his asymptomatic condition would not
itself be sufficient to establish that he was disabled.
In his dissent, Judge Williams supported this implication, arguing
that Runnebaum failed to establish a prima facie case that he was re-
garded as being disabled.20 9 In criticizing the majority's decision,
Judge Williams rejected any argument that asymptomatic HIV disease
could itself constitute a disability under the ADA:
According to Runnebaum, he is disabled for purposes of the
ADA because of his HIV-positive status. The majority accepts
this assertion, concluding that Runnebaum satisfied this ele-
ment because he was regarded as being disabled, even though
he was asymptomatic, and more importantly, affirmatively rep-
resented to NationsBank that he was not handicapped.210
Judge Williams's conclusion underscored his statement implying that
asymptomatic HIV disease is not disabling: "[H]ere, there is no proof
that the 'panicky,' 'uncontrolled' feeling meant that [Runnebaum's
manager] regarded Runnebaum as 'disabled,' much less disabled as a
result of his seropositivity."2 1
203. Id. at 1290.
204. Id. at 1289.
205. Id. at 1290.
206. Id. (citing Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 59 (4th Cir.
1995)).
207. Id.
208. Id.; accord 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994). The court cited evidence that bank
employees were aware that Runnebaurn was HIV positive, that he was taking AZT, and that
the trust department manager felt "panicky" and "uncontrolled" in response to the news
that Runnebaum had HIV disease. Runnebaum 1, 95 F.3d at 1290.
209. Runnebaum I, 95 F.3d at 1302-03 (Williams, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 1302 (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 1303 (emphasis added).
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In a telling footnote, Judge Williams explained his point that
asymptomatic HIV disease is not a disability:
Runnebaum does not appear to assert that he satisfies the
first element of the prima facie case by virtue of suffering an
actual physical or mental impairment as a result of his sero-
positivity, nor could he credibly do so. The parties do not
dispute that Runnebaum has been asymptomatic since 1988
and suffers no affliction arising from his seropositivity. In
fact, Runnebaum's own physician . . . testified that Run-
nebaum "had no ill effects from the disease or the medica-
tions." Comporting with [Runnebaum's physician's]
testimony, Runnebaum has consistently maintained that he
endures no impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity, thereby proving that he is not disabled under the
first prong of the ADA's definition of a disability.212
The position of the majority and the dissent in Runnebaum I is
troubling indeed. The judges dismissed outright any argument that
asymptomatic HIV disease constitutes a per se disability and suggested
that an individual living with asymptomatic HIV disease could not
"credibly" argue that he was disabled under the Ennis-Runnebaum indi-
vidualized-inquiry rule.
In December 1996, the Fourth Circuit vacated Runnebaum I and
granted an en banc rehearing.2 11 In an amicus brief to the Fourth
Circuit, the Legal Services Department of the Whitman-Walker Clinic
wrote in support of Runnebaum on the disability issue. 2 14 Whitman-
Walker argued that individuals with asymptomatic HIV disease are dis-
abled under the first statutory definition of disability, because "from
the outset [HIM infects the blood and the lymphatic system and pro-
gressively destroys the immune system." 52 1  This impairment substan-
tially limits a broad range of an infected individual's major life
activities, including reproduction, intimate sexual relations, child
212. Id. at 1303 n.5 (citation omitted).
213. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Runnebaum I).
214. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Whitman-Walker Clinic Legal Services Department,
Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Run-
nebaum II) (No. 94-2200). Whitman-Walker is the largest provider of comprehensive pri-
mary medical and social services to persons living with HIV and AIDS in the Washington,
D.C. metropolitan area. Id. at 1. The legal department offers pro bono legal assistance to
persons with HIV disease in various legal matters, including HIV-related employment dis-
crimination. Id.
215. Id. at 3.
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rearing, future planning, career and educational goals, obtaining
health, life, and disability insurance, and the ability to travel.2 16
The amicus brief criticized the now-vacated Runnebaum I opinion
for relying on "mistaken" dicta in Ennis in declaring that HIV infec-
tion is not a per se disability, 17 and argued, as this Comment does,
that "the plain language" of the ADA does not preclude HIV disease
from being a per se disability. 18 The ADA's definition of disability,
Whitman-Walker asserted, "is not inconsistent with the existence of
impairments which substantially limit major life activities of every af-
flicted individual."219 The brief further explained:
For instance, blindness and deafness are impairments that
inherently are substantially limiting. As discussed below,
HIV disease is another such impairment. The statute's refer-
ence to "an individual" (§ 12102(2)) and "such individual"
(§ 12102(2)(A)) was intended to provide the flexibility to
protect an individual with an impairment which may not al-
ways be disabling but in fact is disabling in that person's situ-
ation-e.g., a heart condition, depression, or carpel [sic]
tunnel syndrome.220
Whitman-Walker's reading of the plain language of the ADA is consis-
tent with the individualized-inquiry rule as originally set forth in
Forysi.2 2 1
Whitman-Walker astutely observed that should the Fourth Circuit
determine that HIV status is not a per se disability, then unless an
asymptomatic HIV plaintiff "makes a particularized showing of limita-
tions,"222 she would be required to shoulder a more onerous burden
in demonstrating that she is disabled than would be required of a
plaintiff with debilitating HIV disease or AIDS:
If an asymptomatic plaintiff can qualify as "regarded as" dis-
abled under [section 12102 (2) (C)] only if the defendant has
directly expressed prejudice, fear or animus, then the ADA
would provide less protection from intentional HIV discrimi-
nation for asymptomatic individuals with HIV than for per-
216. Id. at 19-23. Whitman-Walker stated that these findings are clearly supported by
the legislative history of the ADA. Id.
217. Id. at 15-16.
218. Id. at 16-17.
219. Id. at 17.
220. Id.
221. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
222. Whitman-Walker Amicus Curiae Brief at 14, Runnebaum II (No. 94-2200).
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sons with AIDS. . . . [S]uch a result would eviscerate
Congress' intent.223
Whitman-Walker urged the Fourth Circuit to reconsider its position in
light of a careful reading of the ADA and its legislative history, while
being mindful of the "critical" and "national importance" of this
issue.224
The Fourth Circuit reheard the case en banc in March 1997.225
In August of that year, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of NationsBank in a seven-to-five
decision, holding that Runnebaum failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination based on disability. 226 Judge Williams, writing
for the majority in Runnebaum II, explained that Runnebaum had
failed to establish sufficient evidence that, inter alia, he was a member
of a protected class-i.e., "disabled" under the Act.
22 7
The most troubling facet of this court's conclusion is its treat-
ment of the statute's primary definition of disability, which requires
that the plaintiff establish that he has a physical or mental impairment
and that the impairment substantially limits one or more of his major
life activities. 22 1 With regard to the impairment prong, the court be-
gan its inquiry by announcing that "[w] hether asymptomatic HIV in-
223. Id.
224. Id. at 3, 14. In response to Whitman-Walker's amicus brief, NationsBank stated that
Whitman-Walker was seeking an advisory opinion on this issue because the issue was not
properly before the court. Appellee's Answer to the Briefs Amicus Curiae of the Whitman-
Walker Clinic, Inc. and of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 4, Run-
nebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Runnebaum
I!) (No. 94-2200). Interestingly, in asserting that Runnebaun claimed no limitation to any
of the major life activities that Whitman-Walker argued to be substantially limited by HIV
disease, NationsBank stated that "[i]t is ironic that an Act which purports to challenge
stereotypical thinking is being construed so stereotypically by Amicus Whitman-Walker
Clinic." Id. at 4-5.
225. Runnebaumn v. NationsBank of Md., NA., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Runnebaum II).
226. Id. at 161. Judge Williams wrote the majority opinion, which Chief Judge Wilkin-
son andJudges Widener, Wilkins, Niemeyer, and Luttigjoined. Id. Judge Hamilton wrote
an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 176 (Hamilton, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Judge Michael wrote a dissenting opinion, which Judges Hall, Murnaghan, Ervin,
and Motz joined. Id. (Michael, J., dissenting).
227. Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 174. The majority also examined whether Runnebaum
had sufficiently produced evidence that he had met the legitimate expectations of his em-
ployer and that there existed a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination, and the
court ruled that he had not. Id. at 174-75. Furthermore, the court ruled that because
Runnebaum failed to prevail on the ADA claim, he could not establish a prima facie case
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at
175-76.
228. See Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 174.
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fection is an impairment under the ADA is first and foremost a
question of statutory interpretation," which begins "'with an examina-
tion of the language used in the statute.' 2 2 9 The court stated that
where the statutory language is plain and has only one meaning, the
court's function is not to interpret the statute but to enforce it accord-
ing to its terms. 230 Furthermore, terms not defined in the statute are
to be construed in their "'ordinary and natural meaning.'
23
'
Therefore, believing that the term "impairment" lacked defini-
tional clarity, the court turned to Webster's Dictionary, which defined
"impair" as to "'make worse by or as if by diminishing in some mate-
rial respect,"' and "impairment" as a "'decrease in strength, value,
amount, or quality. "'232 From these definitions, the court summarily
concluded that "[u] nder these definitions, asymptomatic HIV infec-
tion is simply not an impairment: without symptoms, there are no
diminishing effects on the individual."2 3
Interestingly, the court did not pause to define the term "asymp-
tomatic," but strongly implied that "asymptomatic" means to be with-
out an impairment.234 This implication contrasts with the definition
of "impairment" as worded in Stedman's Medical Dictionary: "A physical
or mental defect at the level of a body system or organ. The official
[World Health Organization] definition is: any loss or abnormality of
psychological, physiological or anatomical structure or function."235
"Asymptomatic" is defined as "[w] ithout symptoms, or producing no
symptoms." 23 6 It is inaccurate to equate "asymptomatic" with "non-
impairment. "237
229. Id. at 167 (quoting Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 738 (1997)).
230. Id. (citing United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1994)).
231. Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)).
232. Id. at 168 (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 603 (1986) ("im-
pair") and WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIvERsxis DICrIONARY 612 (1988) ("impair-
ment")); accord id. ("'To weaken, to make worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or relax, or
otherwise affect in an injurious manner.'" (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICIoNARY 677 (5th ed.
1981) ("impair")); id. ("deterioration" or "lessening" (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DicrioNARY 1131 (1986) ("impairment")). Note that the court did not turn
to a medical dictionary or any other source for authority on this point.
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICIONARY, supra note 1, at 857.
236. Id. at 160.
237. As explained in detail by Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, the asymptomatic
stage of HIV disease does indeed impair the human body:
IMMUNOPATHOGENIC EVENTS DURING CLINICAL LATENCY It has
been the consistent observation of clinicians caring for AIDS patients that, with
few exceptions, there is a gradual and progressive diminution over time of the
level of CD4+ T cells. The slope of the decline is highly predictive of the pattern
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The court concluded that "l[e] xtending the coverage of the ADA
to asymptomatic conditions like Runnebaum's, where no diminishing
effects are exhibited, would run counter to Congress's intention as
expressed in the plain statutory language."2 8
Admittedly unconvinced that "'diminishing effects' can be ana-
lyzed at so low a level of generality," '239 the court dismissed popular
and scientific literature stating that the HIV and the infected body
engage in "mortal combat." The court compared the finding of disa-
bility based on such evidence analogous to the finding of disability in
individuals with genetic predispositions to various diseases, such as
cancer and Alzheimer's disease.240
Also dismissed were the House and Senate Reports on the ADA
that expressly stated that the term "mental or physical impairment"
included HIV infection. The court viewed "isolated references" to
HIV as not differentiating between the symptomatic and asymptom-
of the clinical course and the development of advanced disease. Most patients
are entirely asymptomatic during this progressive decline of CD4+ T cells, which
has led to the term clinical latency. Culturable viremia and p24 antigenemia are
uncommon during this period, and there are very few cells (usually 1:1000 to
1:10,000) which contain HIV provirus and at least I log less cells which are ac-
tively expressing HIV mRNA during this period. In most patients, it is extremely
difficult to detect active virus replication in the peripheral blood mononuclear
cells during this period. However, the progressive decline of CD4+ T cells belies
true viral latency since both cytopathic effects and qualitative dysfunction of T
cells that cannot be explained by mere lymphocyte depletion occur. It has been
demonstrated that even during this prolonged clinically latent period, there is
copious virus contained in the lymph nodes and active virus replication in the
lymph nodes. Therefore, it is essential to distinguish between clinical latency and
true microbiological latency.
THE ASYMPTOMATIC STAGE-CLINICAL LATENCY . . . As emphasized
above, HIV disease with active virus replication progresses during this asymptom-
atic period. Certain patients will remain entirely asymptomatic despite the fact
that their CD4+ T cell counts fall to extremely low levels. Initial symptoms may be
associated with the first manifestations of an opportunistic disease. Other pa-
tients experience varying degrees of intermittent symptoms such as malaise, leth-
argy, weakness, and anorexia which are not persistent enough to be categorized
as constitutional disease. Certain patients, otherwise asymptomatic, develop per-
sistent generalized lymphadenopathy. With few exceptions, there is a progressive
diminution of CD4+ T cell counts during this asymptomatic period which ulti-
mately leads to a state of immunosuppression that is severe enough (CD4+ T cell
count <200 per microliter) to place the patient at high risk for opportunistic, and
hence clinically apparent, disease.
HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 1577, 1587-88 (citations
omitted).
238. Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 168.
239. Id. at 168 n.6 (citations omitted).
240. See id.
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atic stages of HIV infection, which "by their own terms, do not answer
whether asymptomatic HIV infection is an impairment under the stat-
ute."241 The court rejected the use of legislative history and instead
chose to deduce congressional intent through lay definitions of scien-
tific terms.242
The court concluded that "l[t] he plain meaning of 'impairment'
suggests that asymptomatic HIV infection will never qualify as an im-
pairment: by definition, asymptomatic HIV infection exhibits no di-
minishing effects on the individual." 24" The court stated that it would
not go so far as to say that asymptomatic HIV infection is not per se an
impairment, but simply reaffirmed Ennis's requirement that it must
determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether asymptomatic HIV infec-
tion constitutes a "disability" under the statute.244 Nevertheless, the
court, in effect, declared asymptomatic HIV infection not to be an
"impairment" per se:
Runnebaum produced no evidence showing that he was im-
paired, to any degree, during the relevant time period. Run-
nebaum does not assert that he suffers an actual physical or
mental impairment because of his HIV infection, nor could
he credibly do so....
... In light of the plain statutory language and the facts
of this case, we hold that Runnebaum's HIV infection, be-
241. See id. at 169.
242. Id. at 168-69 & n.7. The court supported its rejection of the legislative history as an
aid in statutory interpretation by citing to two Supreme Court opinions authored by Justice
Scalia: Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501
(1988), which stated that "unenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws," and
Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988), which rejected the argument that the
legislative history at issue limited general statutory language.
The court also relied upon Justice Stevens's majority opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987), which adhered to "'the strong presumption that Congress expresses
its intent through the language it chooses.'" Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 169 n.7 (quoting
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 n.12). When this quote is examined in its entirety, a differ-
ent meaning emerges. The full passage reads:
As we have explained, the plain language of this statute appears to settle the
question before us. Therefore, we look to the legislative history to determine
only whether there is "clearly expressed legislative intention" contrary to that lan-
guage, which would require us to question the strong presumption that Congress
expresses its intent through the language it chooses.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 n.12. This statement does not lend credence to the court's
averment that "[we doubt] that the collective intent of a 535-member body is ascertainable
by reference to legislative history." Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 169 n.7.




cause it is asymptomatic, is not a "physical or mental impair-
ment" under § 12102(2) (A) of the ADA.2 45
This language certainly evinces a conclusion that asymptomatic HIV
infection will never constitute an impairment, much less an impair-
ment per se under the language of the Act.
As discussed, the second prong of the first statutory definition
requires there to be a "substantial limitation on ... major life activi-
ties." Because the Act does not expressly define the term "major life
activity," the Fourth Circuit construed the term in accordance with its
ordinary and natural meaning.246 The court, turning to Webster's
Dictionary once again, defined "major" to mean "'[d] emanding great
attention or concern"' and "'greater in dignity, rank, importance, or
interest."247
From these definitions, the court criticized the argument that
procreation and intimate sexual relations were major life activities
substantially limited by Runnebaum's asymptomatic HIV infection.248
While agreeing that "procreation is a fundamental human activity,"
the court stated that it was not certain that procreation constituted a
major life activity within the meaning of the Act 249 and rejected the
proposition that engaging in intimate sexual relations is encompassed
by the Act.25 0 The court entertained the idea, for the purposes of
argument, that even if these endeavors were accepted as major life
activities under the Act, there would be no causal nexus between a
substantial limitation of these activities and the physical effect of
asymptomatic HIV infection. 251 The court explained: "[While w]e
recognize that as a behavioral matter, asymptomatic HIV-infected indi-
viduals may refrain from having children or engaging in sexual rela-
tions 'because of concerns that the offspring or partner will be
infected with the virus[,]' .... as a physical matter, nothing inherent in
the virus substantially limits these activities." 252 Under this line of rea-
soning, it is irrelevant that the infected individual's reaction to his
245. Id. at 169-70.
246. Id. at 170.
247. Id. at 170 (quoting WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY, supra note
232, at 718, and WEBS-rER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcnoNARY, supra note 232, at
1363).
248. Id. at 170-71.
249. Id. at 170 (referencing the debate among the federal circuits on this issue); see also
supra note 139.
250. Runnebaum II, 123 F.3d at 170-71.
251. Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added).
252. Id. at 172.
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condition causes substantial limitation, because the only concern is
whether the condition is inherently limiting.253
The court concluded that even if such activities qualified as major
life activities, there was no evidence in the record that Runnebaum
refrained from procreating or engaging in intimate sexual rela-
tions.254 In language alluding to Runnebaum's homosexuality, the
court observed: "Indeed, nothing in the record so much as suggests
that Runnebaum was at all interested in fathering a child. Moreover,
the record makes clear that Runnebaum's ability to engage in inti-
mate sexual relations was not substantially limited by his HIV infec-
tion; the record shows that he concealed his HIV infection from his
lover."255 NationsBank terminated Runnebaum while he was in the
asymptomatic stage of HIV infection, which operates, according to the
court, as per se not a "disability. '25 6 Accordingly, Runnebaum suf-
fered no physical impairment, nor were any of his major life activities
substantially limited by his physical non-impairment; therefore, he fell
outside the scope of federal protection against discrimination pro-
scribed by the ADA.
In a powerfully worded dissent, Judge Michael, joined by Judges
Hall, Murnaghan, Ervin, and Motz, voiced his opposition to the major-
ity's reasoning.25v Judge Michael began by stressing that the court
granted summary judgment on the basis of Runnebaum's job per-
formance rather than his disease and that, as a result, the issue of





256. The majority explicitly departed from Ennis's case-by-case inquiry rule, not only in
the effect of its ruling regarding asymptomatic HIV disease, but also in acknowledging that
certain conditions, such as blindness and deafness, are indeed per se disabilities requiring
no individualized assessment:
Although a finding of disability under the statute must be made on a case-by-case
basis, we recognize that some conditions will always constitute impairments that
substantially limit the major life activities of the afflicted individual. For instance,
blindness and deafness are physical conditions that always substantially limit the
major life activities of blind and deaf individuals. In such cases, an individualized
determination of whether the condition is an impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities is unnecessary.
Id. at 166 n.5 (citation omitted). This language is remarkably similar to language in Whit-
man-Walker's brief to the Fourth Circuit, and to language in the Senate and House Com-
mittee Reports, each of which stated that conditions such as blindness, deafness, and HIV
infection operate as per se disabilities within the meaning of the ADA. See supra notes 95-
99, 219-220 and accompanying text.
257. Runnebaum I, 123 F.3d at 176 (Michael, J., dissenting).
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Now, however, the majority concludes that Runnebaum's
HIV infection is not a disability. It bases this holding on its
textual reading of the ADA and its own conclusions about
the state of the record. There is much that the majority must
ignore, however, to affirm on the ground that Runnebaum is
not disabled. First, it must ignore that NationsBank con-
ceded Runnebaum's disability before the district court. Sec-
ond, it must ignore the physical effects of HIV upon the body
even when the disease is in its asymptomatic stage. Third, it
must ignore a wealth of legislative history and administrative
interpretation contradictory to its reading.25
8
The dissent recognized that the majority was creating a rule, despite
the dissent's objections, that asymptomatic HLV infection is not a disa-
bility per se.259 Such a conclusion, without allowing Runnebaum the
opportunity to supplement the incomplete trial record on this issue,
amounted to a "rejection, in substance if not in form, of the case-by-
case inquiry suggested by ... [Ennis, and] move[d] this circuit even
further from the mainstream of ADA interpretation." 2 ° "More im-
portantly," Judge Michael declared, "it moves us completely away from
the interpretation that Congress clearly intended."
261
Judge Michael focused upon why the majority chose to decide an
issue-whether Runnebaum was "disabled"-that was not addressed
in the court below. 26 2 Michael found hypocritical the majority's asser-
tion that the disability determination was a question of law-especially
when other circuits had found that asymptomatic HIV infection was a
per se disability-while it simultaneously trumpeted Ennis's case-by-
case inquiry rule. 63
Judge Michael further pointed out that the facts pertaining to the
issue of disability were in no way sufficiently developed in the trial
record to be considered decisive on whether Runnebaum had estab-
lished a prima facie case that he was disabled."6 Judge Michael con-
tinued: "Nevertheless, the majority proceeds to examine the merits of





262. Id. at 177.
263. Id. at 177-78.
264. Id. at 178.
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there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Runnebaum is
disabled. 2
6 5
Even considering the insufficiency of the trial record on appeal,
the dissent concluded that Runnebaum's claim of disability was suffi-
cient to withstand summary judgment under the primary statutory
definition of "disability." 66 With regard to the first prong of the defi-
nition, Judge Michael accepted the definitions of "impair" and "im-
pairment" adopted by the majority, and argued that under any of the
adopted definitions, HIV constitutes an "impairment. 26 7 In a critical
distinction, Judge Michael exposed the majority's error in viewing the
terms "impairment" and "symptoms" as synonymous. In fact, it was
this very error that led the majority to conclude that asymptomatic
HIV disease can never constitute an impairment. But Judge Michael
countered:
Nowhere does the text of the statute . require a "physical
impairment" to be outwardly visible or manifest. The effects
of the HIV virus may not be noticeable to the outside world
until the later stages of the disease, but the body is impaired
as soon as the disease enters it.26 8
Judge Michael opined that "HLV infection comfortably fits within the
plain and unambiguous meaning of impairment."269 Nevertheless, he
admitted that such a broad reading of the term might render it some-
what ambiguous.27 °
He suggested, therefore, that the court turn to the legislative his-
tory for interpretive guidance: "One look at the legislative history,
however, reveals why the majority clings to its textual analysis." 271
Judge Michael examined the legislative history regarding HIV infec-
tion in greater detail than did the majority, concluding that the Sen-
265. Id. Judge Michael lashed out at the majority's failure to appreciate the "realities of
litigation," especially as the trial record available to the appellate court was limited to those
papers regarding the issues raised on summary judgment, and that, with notice, the plain-
tiff could have secured additional discovery that could have yielded sufficient evidence to
meet his burden. Id. at 178 n.2.
266. Id. at 179.
267. Id. at 180.
268. Id. at 181.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1989) ("Con-
cluding that the text is ambiguous ... we then seek guidance from legislative history. .. ");
United States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[B]ecause the relevant statutory
language is susceptible to interpretations other than the one suggested by the Government
and is therefore ambiguous, we turn to the legislative history for assistance in ascertaining
the intent of Congress.")).
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ate and House Committee Reports "could not be clearer: infection
with HIV constitutes an 'impairment' under the ADA."272 Judge
Michael further surveyed the less authoritative floor statements to em-
phasize the "breadth of the congressional presumption that individu-
als with HIV would be covered."27 The dissent concluded: "The
legislative history plainly demonstrates that Congress intended for
HIV to be considered a disability. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a
case in which the legislative history could be more explicit."274
Judge Michael buttressed his evaluation of Congress's intent as
evidenced in the legislative history of the ADA with the many adminis-
trative regulations interpreting the term "impairment." "' He con-
cluded that "the majority's interpretation cannot withstand the stark
realities of asymptomatic HIV, the direct and unambiguous legislative
history, and the administrative regulations, all of which confirm that
Runnebaum was impaired."276 Judge Michael added: "In the end...
the grim and disabling nature of asymptomatic HIV is undeniable." 27 7
With regard to the second prong of the disability definition-
concerning whether Runnebaum's asymptomatic HIV infection sub-
stantially limits one or more of his major life activities-Judge Michael
questioned the majority's rejection of procreation and engaging in
intimate sexual relations as constituting "major life activities":
The question of whether procreation and intimate sexual re-
lations are "major life activities" under the ADA is admittedly
"not free from doubt." The words of the statute, however,
are certainly broad enough to include these activities. Pro-
creation is perhaps the most important life activity, since we
would cease to exist as a species if we no longer reproduced.
And intimate sexual relations, while less important in na-
272. Id. at 182.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 182-83. Judge Michael argued that although the definition of disability is not
specific to any subchapter under the Act, the definition applies to the Act as a whole.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended for each agency delegated
rulemaking authority for a specific subchapter to have the authority to define the term
"impairment" and that that agency's definition must be given "controlling weight" if the
statute is otherwise ambiguous. See id. at 182 & n.7 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). Moreover, "[e]ven if Con-
gress did not grant the EEOC direct statutory authority to define impairment, however, we
still must defer to the EEOC's regulations if they are a 'reasonable interpretation' of the
statute." Id. at 182 n.7 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (requiring deference to a reason-
able agency interpretation if the legislative delegation to an agency is "implicit rather than
explicit")).
276. Id. at 183.
277. Id. at 183 n.10.
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ture's scheme, have consumed enough of humanity's energy
2781and interest to count among such activities.
Again, where there may be ambiguity, the dissent wrote, the court
should defer to the legislative history and the implementing regula-
tions, both of which indicate that procreation and engaging in inti-
mate sexual relations constitute "major life activities" under the
language of the Act.
2 79
The dissent gave short shrift to the majority's distinction between
impairments that are substantially limiting as a "physical matter" and
those that are substantially limiting as a "behavioral matter":
While it has some intuitive plausibility, this distinction is
nowhere within the text, legislative history, or regulatory in-
terpretation of the ADA.... There is no requirement that
the impairment physically limit the life activity, nor is there
any specification about how the impairment must substan-
tially limit that activity. Once again, the majority has no au-
thority to bolster its interpretation....
Moreover, the majority's distinction goes against com-
mon sense .... It is HIV's physical effects, however, upon
procreation and intimate sexual relations that make it sub-
stantially limiting. An individual with HIV stands a signifi-
cant chance of infecting others if he engages in these
activities, and this prospect of spreading the disease is a sub-
stantial limitation.... As the court said in Abbott, "[n] o rea-
sonable juror could conclude that an 8% risk of passing an
incurable, debilitating, and inevitably fatal disease to one's
child is not a substantial restriction on reproductive
activity. "280
Furthermore, the dissent criticized the claim that Runnebaum did not
establish sufficient evidence in the trial record that his asymptomatic
HIV infection substantially limited one of his major life activities, espe-
cially the bold assertion that it was apparent that Runnebaum did not
forego engaging in intimate sexual relations because he concealed his
infection from his lover. "That is too much of a leap for me. I would
not presume to know the status of Runnebaum's 'intimate sexual rela-
tions' merely because he has a boyfriend.
281
278. Id. at 184 (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-40 (lst Cir.), cert. granted in
part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997)).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 184-85 (footnote omitted) (citing Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942).
281. Id. at 185.
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The dissent concluded that, with regard to the primary statutory
definition of disability under the Act, the majority had effectively ex-
cluded individuals with asymptomatic HIV disease:
The majority's opinion must be taken for what it is: a per se
rule that excludes those with asymptomatic HIV from the
protections of the ADA. This result runs counter to the stat-
utory text, medical research, legislative history, administra-
tive regulations, and even our decision in Ennis. This result
is plainly wrong.282
Ennis and Runnebaum clearly indicate that the Fourth Circuit re-
jects asymptomatic HIV disease as a per se disability under the ADA.
It therefore directly follows that if an asymptomatic HIV-positive em-
ployee cannot show that his employer regarded him as disabled, he
has no protection under the Act against discriminatory employment
practices. What makes these cases remarkable is the Fourth Circuit's
belief that so long as HIV threatens only the carrier, there is nothing
physically impairing about the virus's effect that substantially limits a
major life activity of the infected individual; however, if there is
merely a theoretical chance of transmission to non-infected individu-
als, the virus suddenly poses a significant risk to the health and safety
of others.
Just one day before Ennis was argued, the Fourth Circuit heard
arguments on another HIV discrimination case arising under the
ADA. The court's decision in that case, announced five weeks before
Ennis, characterized HIV disease as a significant danger, and not as a
non-disabling, latent blood infection. In Doe v. University of Maryland
Medical System Corp.,2"' an asymptomatic HIV-positive surgical resident
was fired after refusing alternative non-surgical residencies offered by
the hospital, which had discovered his HIV status.2 84 The resident
sued the hospital under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Ti-
tle II of the ADA.285 In discussing whether the resident's asymptom-
atic HIV infection constituted a disability under the federal laws, the
Fourth Circuit stated that the issue was not in dispute and that the
court would instead focus upon whether the resident was "otherwise
qualified":
The parties do not dispute that infection with HIV is a disa-
bility; that were Dr. Doe not HIV-positive, he would be quali-
282. Id. at 186.
283. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
284. Id. at 1262-63.
285. Id. at 1264.
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fled to continue his employment as a neurosurgical resident
at [the hospital]; and that Dr. Doe's residency was termi-
nated because he is HIV-positive. However, [the hospital]
maintains that its decision to terminate Dr. Doe was not dis-
criminatory because he poses a significant risk to the health
or safety of its patients that cannot be eliminated by reason-
able accommodation and therefore is not an otherwise quali-
fied individual with a disability.2" 6
The Fourth Circuit focused on whether the facts established the exist-
ence of a significant risk-the risk of HIV transmission-that could
not be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, and decided that
Dr. Doe did pose a "significant risk to the health or safety of [the
hospital's] patients."287 The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act require a
disabled employee to be otherwise qualified to claim protection under
those Acts.2 88 Therefore, an employee who poses a direct threat or a
"significant risk to the health or safety" of others cannot claim federal
protection against unlawful employment practices.
In reconciling the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in University of Mary-
land Medical System with Ennis and Runnebaum, the court's approach to
asymptomatic HIV infection suggests that so long as the virus remains
within the body of an infected individual, it is insignificant, i.e., there
exists no physical impairment that substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity of that individual. However, once the virus threatens to be trans-
mitted from an infected individual to a non-infected individual, it
poses a significant risk to that other person's health and safety.
Whether the Fourth Circuit considers HIV significant to an individ-
ual's health seems to depend illogically on whether one is infected or
merely at risk of infection. Does the virus somehow become inert after
infecting an individual, or does something change in the court's per-
ception of that infected individual?
The Fourth Circuit's position on asymptomatic HIV infection has
already impacted employment discrimination cases within the circuit.
286. Id. at 1265.
287. Id. at 1265-66. It is telling that the court observed that there was no dispute about
the fact that there have been no confirmed cases of doctor to patient transmission; the risk,
according to the court, was admittedly theoretical. Id. at 1266. The U.S. Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention reported one confirmed case of doctor-to-patient HIV trans-
mission in the United States. This case involved a Florida dentist in 1991. Telephone
Interview with Kitty Warren, HIV Specialist, Communications Office, National Center of
HIV, STD, and TB Prevention, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Mar. 16,
1998).
288. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); Rehabilitation
Act of 1978, 29 U.S.C. § 7 94(a) (1994).
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For example, in Cortes v. McDonald's Corp.,2" 9 a federal court in North
Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of an employer on an
employment discrimination claim filed by an asymptomatic HIV-posi-
five former employee. 90 The district court held that the plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of
an alleged handicap, because he failed to establish that he was
disabled.2 01
The court noted that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that
he was disabled within the meaning of the Act, and that in light of
Ennis, asymptomatic HIV disease was not a per se disability:
Based on its analysis, the Fourth Circuit has declined to fol-
low a number of jurisdictions which have found that to be
HIV-positive is to have a disability per se. In fact, the Ennis
decision expressly rejected that assertion by requiring that
any determination as to disability should be made on a case-
by-case basis.29 2
The plaintiff, therefore, must prove (1) that he has a physical or
mental impairment, and (2) that the impairment substantially limits
one or more of the plaintiff's major life activities. 293 With regard to
the first prong, the court summarily stated that the plaintiff had a
physical impairment by testing positive for HIV infection. 29 4 Never-
theless, the court ruled that the Fourth Circuit required "that it also
be determined that this impairment substantially limit one or more of
plaintiff's major life activities. 29 5
The plaintiffs argument that his major life activity of procreation
was substantially limited by his HIV disease was rejected by the
court.2 9 6 The court stated that, while other courts had recognized
procreation as a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA,29 7
"this court interprets the Fourth Circuit's requirement in Ennis that
289. 955 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
290. Id. at 547.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 545.
293. Id.
294. Id. "Having tested positive for HIV, plaintiff certainly meets the first requirement,
that he have a physical impairment." Id. Note that this finding does not follow the Ennis
dicta, which implied that without affirmative evidence to the contrary, HIV infection alone
is not a physical impairment. See Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55,
60 (4th Cir. 1995).
295. Cortes, 955 F. Supp. at 546.
296. See id.
297. Id. (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d




the disability classification be performed on a case-by-case basis and its
failure to mention reproduction in its Runnebaum opinion to preclude
expansion of the major life functions to include reproduction."298
Therefore, because the plaintiff did not proffer any other evidence of
a major life activity substantially limited by his HIV infection, the court
concluded:
Whether or not this court believes that even asymptomatic
HIV should be considered a disability is immaterial in that
this court is bound by what it finds Fourth Circuit precedent
to require. The Fourth Circuit held in Ennis that HIV is not
a disability per se, but each individual must show he has been
substantially limited in a major life function.2 99
In EEOC v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.,3°° a federal
district court in Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of an
employer on an ADA claim filed by the EEOC on behalf of an em-
ployee."0' The employee alleged that his employer failed to reason-
ably accommodate his need for a mold-free work environment, which
was needed because exposure to mold and fungi weakened the HIV-
positive employee's suppressed immune system.3"2
The court found that there was no material fact in dispute upon
which ajury could reasonably find that the employer failed to reason-
ably accommodate the employee, and therefore it refrained from de-
termining whether the employee was disabled within the meaning of
the Act.303 The court did, however, comment on how it would have
decided if that issue were before the court:
While it was not necessary for the Court to determine
whether [the plaintiff] is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA, had such a determination been required, it is far from
certain that the EEOC would have prevailed on the issue.
The Fourth Circuit has decided [in Ennis] that HIV-positive
status is not per se a "disability" within the meaning of the
ADA. The court explained that the plain language of the
statute requires a case-by-case determination of whether a
298. Cortes, 955 F. Supp. at 546. If the Fourth Circuit does not recognize procreation or
reproduction as a major life activity, the court would be in conflict with the other circuits
on this issue. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940 (1st Cir.), cert. granted in part,
118 S. Ct. 554 (1997) (stating that "reproduction, which is both the source of all life and
one of life's most important activities, easily qualifies" as a major life activity).
299. Cortes, 955 F. Supp. at 547.
300. 949 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Va. 1996).
301. Id. at 404.
302. Id. at 405-06.
303. Id. at 407.
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given impairment substantially limits a major life activity of
the particular individual in question. [The employer's ex-
pert witness's] expert report states that "[the employee] has
had no opportunistic infections" associated with HIV. [The
employee's] chief symptoms, sinusitis, watery eyes, and head-
aches associated with reactions to airborne allergens, are
common to the climate of Tidewater, Virginia, albeit [the
employee's] reactions are alleged to be more severe.3 °4
These two recent decisions signal the recognition by district courts
within the Fourth Circuit of the impact of Ennis and Runnebaum II,
especially as these decisions gain wider acceptance as controlling sum-
mary-judgment precedents.
The court's "individualized-inquiry" rule-which was articulated
in Forrisi, applied in Ennis, and reasserted in Runnebaum I!-ignores
other, more time-honored principles of law. Effectuating the clear in-
tent of Congress and giving proper deference to administrative regu-
lations cannot take a back seat to a haphazard court-created rule of
statutory analysis. To do so, as the Fourth Circuit does, leads the judi-
ciary to impose upon the prerogatives of the legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit has gone a long way toward stripping the pro-
tection of the ADA from individuals with HIV disease. In doing so,
the court has reasoned that the virus creates a significant risk of harm
to others, but imposes an insignificant limitation upon its carrier.
Thus, in University of Maryland Medical System, the virus's deadliness
caused a physician with asymptomatic HIV disease, who performed
invasive medical procedures, to lose the Act's protection. In Ennis
and Runnebaum II, the virus's deadliness was ignored, and the Act's
protections were stripped away from similarly situated individuals. As
a result, the Fourth Circuit has rendered the ADA's remedial purpose
illusory to HIV-infected individuals who have been discriminated
against in employment. The only possible exception applies to those
individuals with debilitating HIV disease, who, most often, are too sick
to work anyway.
If an employer discharges an employee solely because she has
asymptomatic HIV disease, what motivates the employer if not an irra-
tional fear or moral revulsion? It is precisely such damaging stereo-
types that Congress intended the ADA to eliminate. Whether HIV
impairs an individual's hemic or lymphatic system, thereby substan-
304. Id. at 407 n.5 (citations omitted).
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tially limiting reproduction, or whether an irrational perception moti-
vates the discharge, the ADA's purpose is to open doors to
employment and its benefits. The purpose of the ADA is not to main-
tain the barriers HIV-infected individuals must overcome when seek-
ing employment. Congress surely did not intend individuals with HIV
disease, symptomatic or asymptomatic, to fall outside the Act's
protection.
The Fourth Circuit was wrong to exclude individuals with asymp-
tomatic HIV disease from the Act's protection. Congress, recognizing
the necessity for courts to constrain reasonably the elastic scope of the
ADA's protection, defined "disability" to guide courts in their enforce-
ment obligations. Should the Supreme Court in its review of Abbott v.
Bragdon decide that employers can discriminate against individuals
with asymptomatic HIV disease with impunity, it will be left to Con-
gress to use its power to correct the Court's reinterpretation of the
ADA's clear purpose.
